diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 34 |
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h index 7a4f5604be3f..96c2b0b07c4c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include <asm/cmpxchg.h> #include <asm/fixmap.h> +#include <asm/por.h> #include <linux/mmdebug.h> #include <linux/mm_types.h> #include <linux/sched.h> @@ -149,6 +150,24 @@ static inline pteval_t __phys_to_pte_val(phys_addr_t phys) #define pte_accessible(mm, pte) \ (mm_tlb_flush_pending(mm) ? pte_present(pte) : pte_valid(pte)) +static inline bool por_el0_allows_pkey(u8 pkey, bool write, bool execute) +{ + u64 por; + + if (!system_supports_poe()) + return true; + + por = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0); + + if (write) + return por_elx_allows_write(por, pkey); + + if (execute) + return por_elx_allows_exec(por, pkey); + + return por_elx_allows_read(por, pkey); +} + /* * p??_access_permitted() is true for valid user mappings (PTE_USER * bit set, subject to the write permission check). For execute-only @@ -156,8 +175,11 @@ static inline pteval_t __phys_to_pte_val(phys_addr_t phys) * not set) must return false. PROT_NONE mappings do not have the * PTE_VALID bit set. */ -#define pte_access_permitted(pte, write) \ +#define pte_access_permitted_no_overlay(pte, write) \ (((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) && (!(write) || pte_write(pte))) +#define pte_access_permitted(pte, write) \ + (pte_access_permitted_no_overlay(pte, write) && \ + por_el0_allows_pkey(FIELD_GET(PTE_PO_IDX_MASK, pte_val(pte)), write, false)) #define pmd_access_permitted(pmd, write) \ (pte_access_permitted(pmd_pte(pmd), (write))) #define pud_access_permitted(pud, write) \ @@ -373,10 +395,11 @@ static inline void __sync_cache_and_tags(pte_t pte, unsigned int nr_pages) /* * If the PTE would provide user space access to the tags associated * with it then ensure that the MTE tags are synchronised. Although - * pte_access_permitted() returns false for exec only mappings, they - * don't expose tags (instruction fetches don't check tags). + * pte_access_permitted_no_overlay() returns false for exec only + * mappings, they don't expose tags (instruction fetches don't check + * tags). */ - if (system_supports_mte() && pte_access_permitted(pte, false) && + if (system_supports_mte() && pte_access_permitted_no_overlay(pte, false) && !pte_special(pte) && pte_tagged(pte)) mte_sync_tags(pte, nr_pages); } @@ -1103,7 +1126,8 @@ static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot) */ const pteval_t mask = PTE_USER | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_PRESENT_INVALID | PTE_VALID | PTE_WRITE | - PTE_GP | PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK; + PTE_GP | PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK | PTE_PO_IDX_MASK; + /* preserve the hardware dirty information */ if (pte_hw_dirty(pte)) pte = set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_DIRTY)); |