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-rw-r--r--Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst16
-rw-r--r--Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst38
-rw-r--r--Documentation/arch/x86/topology.rst24
-rw-r--r--Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/fred.rst96
-rw-r--r--Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/index.rst1
5 files changed, 141 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index 07caa8fff852..414bc7402ae7 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -87,14 +87,14 @@ The state of SME in the Linux kernel can be documented as follows:
kernel is non-zero).
SME can also be enabled and activated in the BIOS. If SME is enabled and
-activated in the BIOS, then all memory accesses will be encrypted and it will
-not be necessary to activate the Linux memory encryption support. If the BIOS
-merely enables SME (sets bit 23 of the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG), then Linux can activate
-memory encryption by default (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y) or
-by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line. However, if BIOS does
-not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even
-if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter
-is specified.
+activated in the BIOS, then all memory accesses will be encrypted and it
+will not be necessary to activate the Linux memory encryption support.
+
+If the BIOS merely enables SME (sets bit 23 of the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG),
+then memory encryption can be enabled by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the
+kernel command line. However, if BIOS does not enable SME, then Linux
+will not be able to activate memory encryption, even if configured to do
+so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter is specified.
Secure Nested Paging (SNP)
==========================
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst
index e73fdff62c0a..c58c72362911 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst
@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+Also macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS can be used in ASM late in exit-to-user path.
+Other than CFLAGS.ZF, this macro doesn't clobber any registers.
+
The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
(idle) transitions.
@@ -138,17 +141,30 @@ Mitigation points
When transitioning from kernel to user space the CPU buffers are flushed
on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel
- command line. The migitation is enabled through the static key
- mds_user_clear.
-
- The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
- all but one of the kernel to user space transitions. The exception
- is when we return from a Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI), which is
- handled directly in do_nmi().
-
- (The reason that NMI is special is that prepare_exit_to_usermode() can
- enable IRQs. In NMI context, NMIs are blocked, and we don't want to
- enable IRQs with NMIs blocked.)
+ command line. The mitigation is enabled through the feature flag
+ X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF.
+
+ The mitigation is invoked just before transitioning to userspace after
+ user registers are restored. This is done to minimize the window in
+ which kernel data could be accessed after VERW e.g. via an NMI after
+ VERW.
+
+ **Corner case not handled**
+ Interrupts returning to kernel don't clear CPUs buffers since the
+ exit-to-user path is expected to do that anyways. But, there could be
+ a case when an NMI is generated in kernel after the exit-to-user path
+ has cleared the buffers. This case is not handled and NMI returning to
+ kernel don't clear CPU buffers because:
+
+ 1. It is rare to get an NMI after VERW, but before returning to userspace.
+ 2. For an unprivileged user, there is no known way to make that NMI
+ less rare or target it.
+ 3. It would take a large number of these precisely-timed NMIs to mount
+ an actual attack. There's presumably not enough bandwidth.
+ 4. The NMI in question occurs after a VERW, i.e. when user state is
+ restored and most interesting data is already scrubbed. Whats left
+ is only the data that NMI touches, and that may or may not be of
+ any interest.
2. C-State transition
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/topology.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/topology.rst
index 08ebf9edbfc1..7352ab89a55a 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/topology.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/topology.rst
@@ -47,17 +47,21 @@ AMD nomenclature for package is 'Node'.
Package-related topology information in the kernel:
- - cpuinfo_x86.x86_max_cores:
+ - topology_num_threads_per_package()
- The number of cores in a package. This information is retrieved via CPUID.
+ The number of threads in a package.
- - cpuinfo_x86.x86_max_dies:
+ - topology_num_cores_per_package()
- The number of dies in a package. This information is retrieved via CPUID.
+ The number of cores in a package.
+
+ - topology_max_dies_per_package()
+
+ The maximum number of dies in a package.
- cpuinfo_x86.topo.die_id:
- The physical ID of the die. This information is retrieved via CPUID.
+ The physical ID of the die.
- cpuinfo_x86.topo.pkg_id:
@@ -96,16 +100,6 @@ are SMT- or CMT-type threads.
AMDs nomenclature for a CMT core is "Compute Unit". The kernel always uses
"core".
-Core-related topology information in the kernel:
-
- - smp_num_siblings:
-
- The number of threads in a core. The number of threads in a package can be
- calculated by::
-
- threads_per_package = cpuinfo_x86.x86_max_cores * smp_num_siblings
-
-
Threads
=======
A thread is a single scheduling unit. It's the equivalent to a logical Linux
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/fred.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/fred.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9f57e7b91f7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/fred.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=========================================
+Flexible Return and Event Delivery (FRED)
+=========================================
+
+Overview
+========
+
+The FRED architecture defines simple new transitions that change
+privilege level (ring transitions). The FRED architecture was
+designed with the following goals:
+
+1) Improve overall performance and response time by replacing event
+ delivery through the interrupt descriptor table (IDT event
+ delivery) and event return by the IRET instruction with lower
+ latency transitions.
+
+2) Improve software robustness by ensuring that event delivery
+ establishes the full supervisor context and that event return
+ establishes the full user context.
+
+The new transitions defined by the FRED architecture are FRED event
+delivery and, for returning from events, two FRED return instructions.
+FRED event delivery can effect a transition from ring 3 to ring 0, but
+it is used also to deliver events incident to ring 0. One FRED
+instruction (ERETU) effects a return from ring 0 to ring 3, while the
+other (ERETS) returns while remaining in ring 0. Collectively, FRED
+event delivery and the FRED return instructions are FRED transitions.
+
+In addition to these transitions, the FRED architecture defines a new
+instruction (LKGS) for managing the state of the GS segment register.
+The LKGS instruction can be used by 64-bit operating systems that do
+not use the new FRED transitions.
+
+Furthermore, the FRED architecture is easy to extend for future CPU
+architectures.
+
+Software based event dispatching
+================================
+
+FRED operates differently from IDT in terms of event handling. Instead
+of directly dispatching an event to its handler based on the event
+vector, FRED requires the software to dispatch an event to its handler
+based on both the event's type and vector. Therefore, an event dispatch
+framework must be implemented to facilitate the event-to-handler
+dispatch process. The FRED event dispatch framework takes control
+once an event is delivered, and employs a two-level dispatch.
+
+The first level dispatching is event type based, and the second level
+dispatching is event vector based.
+
+Full supervisor/user context
+============================
+
+FRED event delivery atomically save and restore full supervisor/user
+context upon event delivery and return. Thus it avoids the problem of
+transient states due to %cr2 and/or %dr6, and it is no longer needed
+to handle all the ugly corner cases caused by half baked entry states.
+
+FRED allows explicit unblock of NMI with new event return instructions
+ERETS/ERETU, avoiding the mess caused by IRET which unconditionally
+unblocks NMI, e.g., when an exception happens during NMI handling.
+
+FRED always restores the full value of %rsp, thus ESPFIX is no longer
+needed when FRED is enabled.
+
+LKGS
+====
+
+LKGS behaves like the MOV to GS instruction except that it loads the
+base address into the IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE MSR instead of the GS
+segment’s descriptor cache. With LKGS, it ends up with avoiding
+mucking with kernel GS, i.e., an operating system can always operate
+with its own GS base address.
+
+Because FRED event delivery from ring 3 and ERETU both swap the value
+of the GS base address and that of the IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE MSR, plus
+the introduction of LKGS instruction, the SWAPGS instruction is no
+longer needed when FRED is enabled, thus is disallowed (#UD).
+
+Stack levels
+============
+
+4 stack levels 0~3 are introduced to replace the nonreentrant IST for
+event handling, and each stack level should be configured to use a
+dedicated stack.
+
+The current stack level could be unchanged or go higher upon FRED
+event delivery. If unchanged, the CPU keeps using the current event
+stack. If higher, the CPU switches to a new event stack specified by
+the MSR of the new stack level, i.e., MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP[123].
+
+Only execution of a FRED return instruction ERET[US], could lower the
+current stack level, causing the CPU to switch back to the stack it was
+on before a previous event delivery that promoted the stack level.
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/index.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/index.rst
index a56070fc8e77..ad15e9bd623f 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/index.rst
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ x86_64 Support
cpu-hotplug-spec
machinecheck
fsgs
+ fred