diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | .mailmap | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/cross-thread-rsb.rst | 92 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 43 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/of/of_reserved_mem.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/platform/x86/intel/vsec.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/aio.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/dax.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/mm.h | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/shrinker.h | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/parser.c | 39 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/gup.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/kasan/common.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/kasan/generic.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/kasan/shadow.c | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/ksm.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/memory.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/shrinker_debug.c | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/swapfile.c | 20 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/vmscan.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | scripts/gdb/linux/cpus.py | 2 |
24 files changed, 244 insertions, 58 deletions
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ Aleksey Gorelov <[email protected]> Alexander Lobakin <[email protected]> <[email protected]> Alexander Lobakin <[email protected]> <[email protected]> Alexander Lobakin <[email protected]> <[email protected]> +Alexander Mikhalitsyn <[email protected]> <[email protected]> +Alexander Mikhalitsyn <[email protected]> <[email protected]> Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]> <[email protected]> Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> <[email protected]> Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> <[email protected]> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/cross-thread-rsb.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/cross-thread-rsb.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ec6e9f5bcf9e --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/cross-thread-rsb.rst @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ + +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions +======================================= + +Certain AMD and Hygon processors are subject to a cross-thread return address +predictions vulnerability. When running in SMT mode and one sibling thread +transitions out of C0 state, the other sibling thread could use return target +predictions from the sibling thread that transitioned out of C0. + +The Spectre v2 mitigations protect the Linux kernel, as it fills the return +address prediction entries with safe targets when context switching to the idle +thread. However, KVM does allow a VMM to prevent exiting guest mode when +transitioning out of C0. This could result in a guest-controlled return target +being consumed by the sibling thread. + +Affected processors +------------------- + +The following CPUs are vulnerable: + + - AMD Family 17h processors + - Hygon Family 18h processors + +Related CVEs +------------ + +The following CVE entry is related to this issue: + + ============== ======================================= + CVE-2022-27672 Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions + ============== ======================================= + +Problem +------- + +Affected SMT-capable processors support 1T and 2T modes of execution when SMT +is enabled. In 2T mode, both threads in a core are executing code. For the +processor core to enter 1T mode, it is required that one of the threads +requests to transition out of the C0 state. This can be communicated with the +HLT instruction or with an MWAIT instruction that requests non-C0. +When the thread re-enters the C0 state, the processor transitions back +to 2T mode, assuming the other thread is also still in C0 state. + +In affected processors, the return address predictor (RAP) is partitioned +depending on the SMT mode. For instance, in 2T mode each thread uses a private +16-entry RAP, but in 1T mode, the active thread uses a 32-entry RAP. Upon +transition between 1T/2T mode, the RAP contents are not modified but the RAP +pointers (which control the next return target to use for predictions) may +change. This behavior may result in return targets from one SMT thread being +used by RET predictions in the sibling thread following a 1T/2T switch. In +particular, a RET instruction executed immediately after a transition to 1T may +use a return target from the thread that just became idle. In theory, this +could lead to information disclosure if the return targets used do not come +from trustworthy code. + +Attack scenarios +---------------- + +An attack can be mounted on affected processors by performing a series of CALL +instructions with targeted return locations and then transitioning out of C0 +state. + +Mitigation mechanism +-------------------- + +Before entering idle state, the kernel context switches to the idle thread. The +context switch fills the RAP entries (referred to as the RSB in Linux) with safe +targets by performing a sequence of CALL instructions. + +Prevent a guest VM from directly putting the processor into an idle state by +intercepting HLT and MWAIT instructions. + +Both mitigations are required to fully address this issue. + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- + +Use existing Spectre v2 mitigations that will fill the RSB on context switch. + +Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter +--------------------------------------------- + +By default, the KVM hypervisor mitigates this issue by intercepting guest +attempts to transition out of C0. A VMM can use the KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS +capability to override those interceptions, but since this is not common, the +mitigation that covers this path is not enabled by default. + +The mitigation for the KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS capability can be turned on +using the boolean module parameter mitigate_smt_rsb, e.g.: + kvm.mitigate_smt_rsb=1 diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst index 4df436e7c417..e0614760a99e 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. core-scheduling.rst l1d_flush.rst processor_mmio_stale_data.rst + cross-thread-rsb.rst diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 61012476d66e..8f39c46197b8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -466,5 +466,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */ #define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */ #define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */ +#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 9cfca3d7d0e2..f3cc7699e1e1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1256,6 +1256,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { #define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2) /* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */ #define RETBLEED BIT(3) +/* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */ +#define SMT_RSB BIT(4) static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), @@ -1287,8 +1289,8 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), - VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED), - VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB), + VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB), {} }; @@ -1406,6 +1408,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SMT_RSB)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index da4bbd043a7b..f0fa3de2ceb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -191,6 +191,10 @@ module_param(enable_pmu, bool, 0444); bool __read_mostly eager_page_split = true; module_param(eager_page_split, bool, 0644); +/* Enable/disable SMT_RSB bug mitigation */ +bool __read_mostly mitigate_smt_rsb; +module_param(mitigate_smt_rsb, bool, 0444); + /* * Restoring the host value for MSRs that are only consumed when running in * usermode, e.g. SYSCALL MSRs and TSC_AUX, can be deferred until the CPU @@ -4448,10 +4452,15 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) r = KVM_CLOCK_VALID_FLAGS; break; case KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS: - r |= KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT | KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE | - KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE; - if(kvm_can_mwait_in_guest()) - r |= KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT; + r = KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE; + + if (!mitigate_smt_rsb) { + r |= KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT | + KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE; + + if (kvm_can_mwait_in_guest()) + r |= KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT; + } break; case KVM_CAP_X86_SMM: if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM)) @@ -6227,15 +6236,26 @@ split_irqchip_unlock: if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X86_DISABLE_VALID_EXITS) break; - if ((cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT) && - kvm_can_mwait_in_guest()) - kvm->arch.mwait_in_guest = true; - if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT) - kvm->arch.hlt_in_guest = true; if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE) kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true; - if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE) - kvm->arch.cstate_in_guest = true; + +#define SMT_RSB_MSG "This processor is affected by the Cross-Thread Return Predictions vulnerability. " \ + "KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS should only be used with SMT disabled or trusted guests." + + if (!mitigate_smt_rsb) { + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB) && cpu_smt_possible() && + (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE)) + pr_warn_once(SMT_RSB_MSG); + + if ((cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT) && + kvm_can_mwait_in_guest()) + kvm->arch.mwait_in_guest = true; + if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT) + kvm->arch.hlt_in_guest = true; + if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE) + kvm->arch.cstate_in_guest = true; + } + r = 0; break; case KVM_CAP_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO: @@ -13456,6 +13476,7 @@ EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_exit); static int __init kvm_x86_init(void) { kvm_mmu_x86_module_init(); + mitigate_smt_rsb &= boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB) && cpu_smt_possible(); return 0; } module_init(kvm_x86_init); diff --git a/drivers/of/of_reserved_mem.c b/drivers/of/of_reserved_mem.c index 65f3b02a0e4e..f90975e00446 100644 --- a/drivers/of/of_reserved_mem.c +++ b/drivers/of/of_reserved_mem.c @@ -48,9 +48,10 @@ static int __init early_init_dt_alloc_reserved_memory_arch(phys_addr_t size, err = memblock_mark_nomap(base, size); if (err) memblock_phys_free(base, size); - kmemleak_ignore_phys(base); } + kmemleak_ignore_phys(base); + return err; } diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/vsec.c b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/vsec.c index bb81b8b1f7e9..89c5374e33b3 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/vsec.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/vsec.c @@ -408,14 +408,23 @@ static const struct intel_vsec_platform_info dg1_info = { .quirks = VSEC_QUIRK_NO_DVSEC | VSEC_QUIRK_EARLY_HW, }; +/* MTL info */ +static const struct intel_vsec_platform_info mtl_info = { + .quirks = VSEC_QUIRK_NO_WATCHER | VSEC_QUIRK_NO_CRASHLOG, +}; + #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_VSEC_ADL 0x467d #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_VSEC_DG1 0x490e +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_VSEC_MTL_M 0x7d0d +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_VSEC_MTL_S 0xad0d #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_VSEC_OOBMSM 0x09a7 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_VSEC_RPL 0xa77d #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_VSEC_TGL 0x9a0d static const struct pci_device_id intel_vsec_pci_ids[] = { { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, VSEC_ADL, &tgl_info) }, { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, VSEC_DG1, &dg1_info) }, + { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, VSEC_MTL_M, &mtl_info) }, + { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, VSEC_MTL_S, &mtl_info) }, { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, VSEC_OOBMSM, &(struct intel_vsec_platform_info) {}) }, { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, VSEC_RPL, &tgl_info) }, { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, VSEC_TGL, &tgl_info) }, @@ -361,6 +361,9 @@ static int aio_ring_mremap(struct vm_area_struct *vma) spin_lock(&mm->ioctx_lock); rcu_read_lock(); table = rcu_dereference(mm->ioctx_table); + if (!table) + goto out_unlock; + for (i = 0; i < table->nr; i++) { struct kioctx *ctx; @@ -374,6 +377,7 @@ static int aio_ring_mremap(struct vm_area_struct *vma) } } +out_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); spin_unlock(&mm->ioctx_lock); return res; @@ -1271,8 +1271,9 @@ static s64 dax_unshare_iter(struct iomap_iter *iter) if (ret < 0) goto out_unlock; - ret = copy_mc_to_kernel(daddr, saddr, length); - if (ret) + if (copy_mc_to_kernel(daddr, saddr, length) == 0) + ret = length; + else ret = -EIO; out_unlock: diff --git a/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c b/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c index b88d19e9581e..c8469c656e0d 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c +++ b/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(struct super_block *sb, u64 table_start, /* Sanity check values */ /* there is always at least one xattr id */ - if (*xattr_ids <= 0) + if (*xattr_ids == 0) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); len = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES(*xattr_ids); diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 8f857163ac89..f13f20258ce9 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ extern int mmap_rnd_compat_bits __read_mostly; * define their own version of this macro in <asm/pgtable.h> */ #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 -/* This function must be updated when the size of struct page grows above 80 +/* This function must be updated when the size of struct page grows above 96 * or reduces below 56. The idea that compiler optimizes out switch() * statement, and only leaves move/store instructions. Also the compiler can * combine write statements if they are both assignments and can be reordered, @@ -148,12 +148,18 @@ static inline void __mm_zero_struct_page(struct page *page) { unsigned long *_pp = (void *)page; - /* Check that struct page is either 56, 64, 72, or 80 bytes */ + /* Check that struct page is either 56, 64, 72, 80, 88 or 96 bytes */ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct page) & 7); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct page) < 56); - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct page) > 80); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct page) > 96); switch (sizeof(struct page)) { + case 96: + _pp[11] = 0; + fallthrough; + case 88: + _pp[10] = 0; + fallthrough; case 80: _pp[9] = 0; fallthrough; diff --git a/include/linux/shrinker.h b/include/linux/shrinker.h index 71310efe2fab..7bde8e1c228a 100644 --- a/include/linux/shrinker.h +++ b/include/linux/shrinker.h @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ extern void synchronize_shrinkers(void); #ifdef CONFIG_SHRINKER_DEBUG extern int shrinker_debugfs_add(struct shrinker *shrinker); -extern void shrinker_debugfs_remove(struct shrinker *shrinker); +extern struct dentry *shrinker_debugfs_remove(struct shrinker *shrinker); extern int __printf(2, 3) shrinker_debugfs_rename(struct shrinker *shrinker, const char *fmt, ...); #else /* CONFIG_SHRINKER_DEBUG */ @@ -115,8 +115,9 @@ static inline int shrinker_debugfs_add(struct shrinker *shrinker) { return 0; } -static inline void shrinker_debugfs_remove(struct shrinker *shrinker) +static inline struct dentry *shrinker_debugfs_remove(struct shrinker *shrinker) { + return NULL; } static inline __printf(2, 3) int shrinker_debugfs_rename(struct shrinker *shrinker, const char *fmt, ...) diff --git a/lib/parser.c b/lib/parser.c index bcb23484100e..2b5e2b480253 100644 --- a/lib/parser.c +++ b/lib/parser.c @@ -11,6 +11,15 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/string.h> +/* + * max size needed by different bases to express U64 + * HEX: "0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" --> 18 + * DEC: "18446744073709551615" --> 20 + * OCT: "01777777777777777777777" --> 23 + * pick the max one to define NUMBER_BUF_LEN + */ +#define NUMBER_BUF_LEN 24 + /** * match_one - Determines if a string matches a simple pattern * @s: the string to examine for presence of the pattern @@ -129,14 +138,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(match_token); static int match_number(substring_t *s, int *result, int base) { char *endp; - char *buf; + char buf[NUMBER_BUF_LEN]; int ret; long val; - buf = match_strdup(s); - if (!buf) - return -ENOMEM; - + if (match_strlcpy(buf, s, NUMBER_BUF_LEN) >= NUMBER_BUF_LEN) + return -ERANGE; ret = 0; val = simple_strtol(buf, &endp, base); if (endp == buf) @@ -145,7 +152,6 @@ static int match_number(substring_t *s, int *result, int base) ret = -ERANGE; else *result = (int) val; - kfree(buf); return ret; } @@ -163,18 +169,15 @@ static int match_number(substring_t *s, int *result, int base) */ static int match_u64int(substring_t *s, u64 *result, int base) { - char *buf; + char buf[NUMBER_BUF_LEN]; int ret; u64 val; - buf = match_strdup(s); - if (!buf) - return -ENOMEM; - + if (match_strlcpy(buf, s, NUMBER_BUF_LEN) >= NUMBER_BUF_LEN) + return -ERANGE; ret = kstrtoull(buf, base, &val); if (!ret) *result = val; - kfree(buf); return ret; } @@ -206,14 +209,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(match_int); */ int match_uint(substring_t *s, unsigned int *result) { - int err = -ENOMEM; - char *buf = match_strdup(s); + char buf[NUMBER_BUF_LEN]; - if (buf) { - err = kstrtouint(buf, 10, result); - kfree(buf); - } - return err; + if (match_strlcpy(buf, s, NUMBER_BUF_LEN) >= NUMBER_BUF_LEN) + return -ERANGE; + + return kstrtouint(buf, 10, result); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(match_uint); @@ -1914,7 +1914,7 @@ static unsigned long collect_longterm_unpinnable_pages( drain_allow = false; } - if (!folio_isolate_lru(folio)) + if (folio_isolate_lru(folio)) continue; list_add_tail(&folio->lru, movable_page_list); diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c index 833bf2cfd2a3..21e66d7f261d 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/common.c +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -246,6 +246,9 @@ bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, static inline bool ____kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) { + if (!kasan_arch_is_ready()) + return false; + if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr))) { kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip, KASAN_REPORT_INVALID_FREE); return true; diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c index b076f597a378..cb762982c8ba 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c @@ -191,7 +191,12 @@ bool kasan_check_range(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr) { - s8 shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr)); + s8 shadow_byte; + + if (!kasan_arch_is_ready()) + return true; + + shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr)); return shadow_byte >= 0 && shadow_byte < KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE; } diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c index 2fba1f51f042..15cfb34d16a1 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c @@ -291,6 +291,9 @@ int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) unsigned long shadow_start, shadow_end; int ret; + if (!kasan_arch_is_ready()) + return 0; + if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr((void *)addr)) return 0; @@ -459,6 +462,9 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long region_start, region_end; unsigned long size; + if (!kasan_arch_is_ready()) + return; + region_start = ALIGN(start, KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE); region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(end, KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE); @@ -502,6 +508,9 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size, * with setting memory tags, so the KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT flag is ignored. */ + if (!kasan_arch_is_ready()) + return (void *)start; + if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start)) return (void *)start; @@ -524,6 +533,9 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size, */ void __kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size) { + if (!kasan_arch_is_ready()) + return; + if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start)) return; @@ -2629,8 +2629,11 @@ struct page *ksm_might_need_to_copy(struct page *page, new_page = NULL; } if (new_page) { - copy_user_highpage(new_page, page, address, vma); - + if (copy_mc_user_highpage(new_page, page, address, vma)) { + put_page(new_page); + memory_failure_queue(page_to_pfn(page), 0); + return ERR_PTR(-EHWPOISON); + } SetPageDirty(new_page); __SetPageUptodate(new_page); __SetPageLocked(new_page); diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c index 3e836fecd035..f526b9152bef 100644 --- a/mm/memory.c +++ b/mm/memory.c @@ -3840,6 +3840,9 @@ vm_fault_t do_swap_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) if (unlikely(!page)) { ret = VM_FAULT_OOM; goto out_page; + } else if (unlikely(PTR_ERR(page) == -EHWPOISON)) { + ret = VM_FAULT_HWPOISON; + goto out_page; } folio = page_folio(page); diff --git a/mm/shrinker_debug.c b/mm/shrinker_debug.c index b05295bab322..39c3491e28a3 100644 --- a/mm/shrinker_debug.c +++ b/mm/shrinker_debug.c @@ -246,18 +246,21 @@ int shrinker_debugfs_rename(struct shrinker *shrinker, const char *fmt, ...) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(shrinker_debugfs_rename); -void shrinker_debugfs_remove(struct shrinker *shrinker) +struct dentry *shrinker_debugfs_remove(struct shrinker *shrinker) { + struct dentry *entry = shrinker->debugfs_entry; + lockdep_assert_held(&shrinker_rwsem); kfree_const(shrinker->name); shrinker->name = NULL; - if (!shrinker->debugfs_entry) - return; + if (entry) { + ida_free(&shrinker_debugfs_ida, shrinker->debugfs_id); + shrinker->debugfs_entry = NULL; + } - debugfs_remove_recursive(shrinker->debugfs_entry); - ida_free(&shrinker_debugfs_ida, shrinker->debugfs_id); + return entry; } static int __init shrinker_debugfs_init(void) diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c index 4fa440e87cd6..eb9b0bf1fcdd 100644 --- a/mm/swapfile.c +++ b/mm/swapfile.c @@ -1764,12 +1764,15 @@ static int unuse_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd, struct page *swapcache; spinlock_t *ptl; pte_t *pte, new_pte; + bool hwposioned = false; int ret = 1; swapcache = page; page = ksm_might_need_to_copy(page, vma, addr); if (unlikely(!page)) return -ENOMEM; + else if (unlikely(PTR_ERR(page) == -EHWPOISON)) + hwposioned = true; pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, pmd, addr, &ptl); if (unlikely(!pte_same_as_swp(*pte, swp_entry_to_pte(entry)))) { @@ -1777,15 +1780,19 @@ static int unuse_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd, goto out; } - if (unlikely(!PageUptodate(page))) { - pte_t pteval; + if (unlikely(hwposioned || !PageUptodate(page))) { + swp_entry_t swp_entry; dec_mm_counter(vma->vm_mm, MM_SWAPENTS); - pteval = swp_entry_to_pte(make_swapin_error_entry()); - set_pte_at(vma->vm_mm, addr, pte, pteval); - swap_free(entry); + if (hwposioned) { + swp_entry = make_hwpoison_entry(swapcache); + page = swapcache; + } else { + swp_entry = make_swapin_error_entry(); + } + new_pte = swp_entry_to_pte(swp_entry); ret = 0; - goto out; + goto setpte; } /* See do_swap_page() */ @@ -1817,6 +1824,7 @@ static int unuse_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd, new_pte = pte_mksoft_dirty(new_pte); if (pte_swp_uffd_wp(*pte)) new_pte = pte_mkuffd_wp(new_pte); +setpte: set_pte_at(vma->vm_mm, addr, pte, new_pte); swap_free(entry); out: diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c index bf3eedf0209c..5b7b8d4f5297 100644 --- a/mm/vmscan.c +++ b/mm/vmscan.c @@ -741,6 +741,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_shrinker); */ void unregister_shrinker(struct shrinker *shrinker) { + struct dentry *debugfs_entry; + if (!(shrinker->flags & SHRINKER_REGISTERED)) return; @@ -749,9 +751,11 @@ void unregister_shrinker(struct shrinker *shrinker) shrinker->flags &= ~SHRINKER_REGISTERED; if (shrinker->flags & SHRINKER_MEMCG_AWARE) unregister_memcg_shrinker(shrinker); - shrinker_debugfs_remove(shrinker); + debugfs_entry = shrinker_debugfs_remove(shrinker); up_write(&shrinker_rwsem); + debugfs_remove_recursive(debugfs_entry); + kfree(shrinker->nr_deferred); shrinker->nr_deferred = NULL; } diff --git a/scripts/gdb/linux/cpus.py b/scripts/gdb/linux/cpus.py index 15fc4626d236..9ee99f9fae8d 100644 --- a/scripts/gdb/linux/cpus.py +++ b/scripts/gdb/linux/cpus.py @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ def get_current_task(cpu): task_ptr_type = task_type.get_type().pointer() if utils.is_target_arch("x86"): - var_ptr = gdb.parse_and_eval("¤t_task") + var_ptr = gdb.parse_and_eval("&pcpu_hot.current_task") return per_cpu(var_ptr, cpu).dereference() elif utils.is_target_arch("aarch64"): current_task_addr = gdb.parse_and_eval("$SP_EL0") |