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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c5
2 files changed, 8 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 07756b7348ae..fd6e316c1a23 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -2974,9 +2974,6 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE);
svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
- /* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
- clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
-
/* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
@@ -3002,6 +2999,12 @@ void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
clr_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
+ /*
+ * Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests, e.g. for the VMware backdoor, as
+ * KVM can't decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
+ */
+ clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+
if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
sev_es_init_vmcb(svm);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 42f17ae99c9e..a0e803f2a574 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1243,10 +1243,9 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
* trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
* We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
- * as VMware does. Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests as KVM can't
- * decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
+ * as VMware does.
*/
- if (enable_vmware_backdoor && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);