diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 5 |
2 files changed, 8 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 07756b7348ae..fd6e316c1a23 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -2974,9 +2974,6 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE); svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE); - /* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */ - clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR); - /* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV); @@ -3002,6 +2999,12 @@ void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE; clr_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR); + /* + * Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests, e.g. for the VMware backdoor, as + * KVM can't decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction. + */ + clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR); + if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) sev_es_init_vmcb(svm); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 42f17ae99c9e..a0e803f2a574 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -1243,10 +1243,9 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap. * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway - * as VMware does. Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests as KVM can't - * decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction. + * as VMware does. */ - if (enable_vmware_backdoor && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) + if (enable_vmware_backdoor) set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR); svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR); |