powerpc/ima: Fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy

To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature
twice (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA,
powerpc secure boot rules define an IMA architecture specific policy
rule only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not enabled. This,
unfortunately, does not take into account the ability of enabling
"sig_enforce" on the boot command line (module.sig_enforce=1).

Including the IMA module appraise rule results in failing the
finit_module syscall, unless the module signing public key is loaded
onto the IMA keyring.

This patch fixes secure boot policy rules to be based on
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG instead.

Fixes: 4238fad366a6 ("powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules")
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions