x86/mm/pti: Keep permissions when cloning kernel text in pti_clone_kernel_text()

Mapping the kernel text area to user-space makes only sense if it has the
same permissions as in the kernel page-table.  If permissions are different
this will cause a TLB reload when using the kernel page-table, which is as
good as not mapping it at all.

On 64-bit kernels this patch makes no difference, as the whole range cloned
by pti_clone_kernel_text() is mapped RO anyway. On 32 bit there are
writeable mappings in the range, so just keep the permissions as they are.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <[email protected]>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: David Laight <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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