x86/kexec: Do not map kexec area as decrypted when SEV is active

When a virtual machine panics, its memory needs to be dumped for
analysis. With memory encryption in the picture, special care must be
taken when loading a kexec/kdump kernel in a SEV guest.

A SEV guest starts and runs fully encrypted. In order to load a kexec
kernel and initrd, arch_kexec_post_{alloc,free}_pages() need to not map
areas as decrypted unconditionally but differentiate whether the kernel
is running as a SEV guest and if so, leave kexec area encrypted.

 [ bp: Reduce commit message to the relevant information pertaining to
   this commit only. ]

Co-developed-by: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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