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authorDan Williams <[email protected]>2018-01-29 17:02:54 -0800
committerThomas Gleixner <[email protected]>2018-01-30 21:54:31 +0100
commitc7f631cb07e7da06ac1d231ca178452339e32a94 (patch)
tree216f74de319c368e9a32162c346c071eff3c38bb /tools/perf/scripts/python/call-graph-from-sql.py
parent304ec1b050310548db33063e567123fae8fd0301 (diff)
x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e. array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by: cmp %limit, %ptr sbb %mask, %mask and %mask, %ptr With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit or NULL. Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417469.33451.11804043010080838495.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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