diff options
author | Dan Williams <[email protected]> | 2018-01-29 17:02:54 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> | 2018-01-30 21:54:31 +0100 |
commit | c7f631cb07e7da06ac1d231ca178452339e32a94 (patch) | |
tree | 216f74de319c368e9a32162c346c071eff3c38bb /tools/perf/scripts/python/call-graph-from-sql.py | |
parent | 304ec1b050310548db33063e567123fae8fd0301 (diff) |
x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
Quoting Linus:
I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check
near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be
mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e.
array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by:
cmp %limit, %ptr
sbb %mask, %mask
and %mask, %ptr
With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit
or NULL.
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417469.33451.11804043010080838495.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/scripts/python/call-graph-from-sql.py')
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