tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits

Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender
to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory
usage and/or overflow 32bit counters.

TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes,
so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting
of retransmit queue.

A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP
did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded.

Note that this counter might increase in the case applications
use SO_SNDBUF socket option to lower sk_sndbuf.

CVE-2019-11478 : tcp_fragment, prevent fragmenting a packet when the
	socket is already using more than half the allowed space

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index b8e3bbb85211..1bb1c46b4aba 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -1296,6 +1296,11 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, enum tcp_queue tcp_queue,
 	if (nsize < 0)
 		nsize = 0;
 
+	if (unlikely((sk->sk_wmem_queued >> 1) > sk->sk_sndbuf)) {
+		NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPWQUEUETOOBIG);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
 	if (skb_unclone(skb, gfp))
 		return -ENOMEM;