diff options
author | David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 2018-03-06 00:53:44 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 2018-03-06 01:20:46 -0500 |
commit | 0f3e9c97eb5a97972b0c0076a5cc01bb142f8e70 (patch) | |
tree | 439c89ea3c87496c23e167148f2cdbefb6e82b30 /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | |
parent | ef3f6c256f0b4711a3ef1489797b95820be5ab01 (diff) | |
parent | ce380619fab99036f5e745c7a865b21c59f005f6 (diff) |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
All of the conflicts were cases of overlapping changes.
In net/core/devlink.c, we have to make care that the
resouce size_params have become a struct member rather
than a pointer to such an object.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index d71c8b54b696..bfca937bdcc3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -300,6 +300,15 @@ retpoline_auto: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); } + + /* + * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect + * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); + pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); + } } #undef pr_fmt @@ -326,8 +335,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, c if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", spectre_v2_module_string()); } #endif |