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authorJulien Tinnes <[email protected]>2009-06-26 20:27:40 +0200
committerLinus Torvalds <[email protected]>2009-07-12 12:21:33 -0700
commitf9fabcb58a6d26d6efde842d1703ac7cfa9427b6 (patch)
tree3bab868d1db85521932b77897983e7c673f7a669 /arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
parenta137802ee839ace40079bebde24cfb416f73208a (diff)
personality: fix PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
We have found that the current PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID mask on Linux doesn't include neither ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT, nor MMAP_PAGE_ZERO. The current mask is READ_IMPLIES_EXEC|ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE. We believe it is important to add MMAP_PAGE_ZERO, because by using this personality it is possible to have the first page mapped inside a process running as setuid root. This could be used in those scenarios: - Exploiting a NULL pointer dereference issue in a setuid root binary - Bypassing the mmap_min_addr restrictions of the Linux kernel: by running a setuid binary that would drop privileges before giving us control back (for instance by loading a user-supplied library), we could get the first page mapped in a process we control. By further using mremap and mprotect on this mapping, we can then completely bypass the mmap_min_addr restrictions. Less importantly, we believe ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT should also be added since on x86 32bits it will in practice disable most of the address space layout randomization (only the stack will remain randomized). Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eugene Teo <[email protected]> [ Shortened lines and fixed whitespace as per Christophs' suggestion ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c')
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