<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/security/smack, branch v6.12.1</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel with personal config changes for arch linux</subtitle>
<id>https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/atom?h=v6.12.1</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/atom?h=v6.12.1'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/'/>
<updated>2024-09-24T17:18:15Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240923' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm</title>
<updated>2024-09-24T17:18:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-24T17:18:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=5c36498d06b9b00393c2f35edbf16b28194375fa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5c36498d06b9b00393c2f35edbf16b28194375fa</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull LSM fixes from Paul Moore:

 - Add a missing security_mmap_file() check to the remap_file_pages()
   syscall

 - Properly reference the SELinux and Smack LSM blobs in the
   security_watch_key() LSM hook

 - Fix a random IPE selftest crash caused by a missing list terminator
   in the test

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240923' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  ipe: Add missing terminator to list of unit tests
  selinux,smack: properly reference the LSM blob in security_watch_key()
  mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux,smack: properly reference the LSM blob in security_watch_key()</title>
<updated>2024-09-19T20:37:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-19T15:37:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=8a23c9e1ba4642b60420e8caa75859883a509c24'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8a23c9e1ba4642b60420e8caa75859883a509c24</id>
<content type='text'>
Unfortunately when we migrated the lifecycle management of the key LSM
blob to the LSM framework we forgot to convert the security_watch_key()
callbacks for SELinux and Smack.  This patch corrects this by making use
of the selinux_key() and smack_key() helper functions respectively.

This patch also removes some input checking in the Smack callback as it
is no longer needed.

Fixes: 5f8d28f6d7d5 ("lsm: infrastructure management of the key security blob")
Reported-by: syzbot+044fdf24e96093584232@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+044fdf24e96093584232@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'Smack-for-6.12' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next</title>
<updated>2024-09-19T11:09:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-19T11:09:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=509d2cd12a10d057fdf72f565b930f9a81140d59'/>
<id>urn:sha1:509d2cd12a10d057fdf72f565b930f9a81140d59</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
 "Two patches: one is a simple indentation correction, the other
  corrects a potentially rcu unsafe pointer assignment"

* tag 'Smack-for-6.12' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
  smackfs: Use rcu_assign_pointer() to ensure safe assignment in smk_set_cipso
  security: smack: Fix indentation in smack_netfilter.c
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm</title>
<updated>2024-09-16T16:19:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-16T16:19:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=a430d95c5efa2b545d26a094eb5f624e36732af0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a430d95c5efa2b545d26a094eb5f624e36732af0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:

 - Move the LSM framework to static calls

   This transitions the vast majority of the LSM callbacks into static
   calls. Those callbacks which haven't been converted were left as-is
   due to the general ugliness of the changes required to support the
   static call conversion; we can revisit those callbacks at a future
   date.

 - Add the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM

   This adds a new LSM, Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE). There is
   plenty of documentation about IPE in this patches, so I'll refrain
   from going into too much detail here, but the basic motivation behind
   IPE is to provide a mechanism such that administrators can restrict
   execution to only those binaries which come from integrity protected
   storage, e.g. a dm-verity protected filesystem. You will notice that
   IPE requires additional LSM hooks in the initramfs, dm-verity, and
   fs-verity code, with the associated patches carrying ACK/review tags
   from the associated maintainers. We couldn't find an obvious
   maintainer for the initramfs code, but the IPE patchset has been
   widely posted over several years.

   Both Deven Bowers and Fan Wu have contributed to IPE's development
   over the past several years, with Fan Wu agreeing to serve as the IPE
   maintainer moving forward. Once IPE is accepted into your tree, I'll
   start working with Fan to ensure he has the necessary accounts, keys,
   etc. so that he can start submitting IPE pull requests to you
   directly during the next merge window.

 - Move the lifecycle management of the LSM blobs to the LSM framework

   Management of the LSM blobs (the LSM state buffers attached to
   various kernel structs, typically via a void pointer named "security"
   or similar) has been mixed, some blobs were allocated/managed by
   individual LSMs, others were managed by the LSM framework itself.

   Starting with this pull we move management of all the LSM blobs,
   minus the XFRM blob, into the framework itself, improving consistency
   across LSMs, and reducing the amount of duplicated code across LSMs.
   Due to some additional work required to migrate the XFRM blob, it has
   been left as a todo item for a later date; from a practical
   standpoint this omission should have little impact as only SELinux
   provides a XFRM LSM implementation.

 - Fix problems with the LSM's handling of F_SETOWN

   The LSM hook for the fcntl(F_SETOWN) operation had a couple of
   problems: it was racy with itself, and it was disconnected from the
   associated DAC related logic in such a way that the LSM state could
   be updated in cases where the DAC state would not. We fix both of
   these problems by moving the security_file_set_fowner() hook into the
   same section of code where the DAC attributes are updated. Not only
   does this resolve the DAC/LSM synchronization issue, but as that code
   block is protected by a lock, it also resolve the race condition.

 - Fix potential problems with the security_inode_free() LSM hook

   Due to use of RCU to protect inodes and the placement of the LSM hook
   associated with freeing the inode, there is a bit of a challenge when
   it comes to managing any LSM state associated with an inode. The VFS
   folks are not open to relocating the LSM hook so we have to get
   creative when it comes to releasing an inode's LSM state.
   Traditionally we have used a single LSM callback within the hook that
   is triggered when the inode is "marked for death", but not actually
   released due to RCU.

   Unfortunately, this causes problems for LSMs which want to take an
   action when the inode's associated LSM state is actually released; so
   we add an additional LSM callback, inode_free_security_rcu(), that is
   called when the inode's LSM state is released in the RCU free
   callback.

 - Refactor two LSM hooks to better fit the LSM return value patterns

   The vast majority of the LSM hooks follow the "return 0 on success,
   negative values on failure" pattern, however, there are a small
   handful that have unique return value behaviors which has caused
   confusion in the past and makes it difficult for the BPF verifier to
   properly vet BPF LSM programs. This includes patches to
   convert two of these"special" LSM hooks to the common 0/-ERRNO pattern.

 - Various cleanups and improvements

   A handful of patches to remove redundant code, better leverage the
   IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper, add missing "static" markings, and do some
   minor style fixups.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (40 commits)
  security: Update file_set_fowner documentation
  fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
  lsm: Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper function
  lsm: remove LSM_COUNT and LSM_CONFIG_COUNT
  ipe: Remove duplicated include in ipe.c
  lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
  lsm: count the LSMs enabled at compile time
  kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling
  init/main.c: Initialize early LSMs after arch code, static keys and calls.
  MAINTAINERS: add IPE entry with Fan Wu as maintainer
  documentation: add IPE documentation
  ipe: kunit test for parser
  scripts: add boot policy generation program
  ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider
  fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
  lsm: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook
  ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider
  dm-verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
  block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices
  ipe: add permissive toggle
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'vfs-6.12.file' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs</title>
<updated>2024-09-16T07:14:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-16T07:14:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=3352633ce6b221d64bf40644d412d9670e7d56e3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3352633ce6b221d64bf40644d412d9670e7d56e3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs file updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This is the work to cleanup and shrink struct file significantly.

  Right now, (focusing on x86) struct file is 232 bytes. After this
  series struct file will be 184 bytes aka 3 cacheline and a spare 8
  bytes for future extensions at the end of the struct.

  With struct file being as ubiquitous as it is this should make a
  difference for file heavy workloads and allow further optimizations in
  the future.

   - struct fown_struct was embedded into struct file letting it take up
     32 bytes in total when really it shouldn't even be embedded in
     struct file in the first place. Instead, actual users of struct
     fown_struct now allocate the struct on demand. This frees up 24
     bytes.

   - Move struct file_ra_state into the union containg the cleanup hooks
     and move f_iocb_flags out of the union. This closes a 4 byte hole
     we created earlier and brings struct file to 192 bytes. Which means
     struct file is 3 cachelines and we managed to shrink it by 40
     bytes.

   - Reorder struct file so that nothing crosses a cacheline.

     I suspect that in the future we will end up reordering some members
     to mitigate false sharing issues or just because someone does
     actually provide really good perf data.

   - Shrinking struct file to 192 bytes is only part of the work.

     Files use a slab that is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU and when a kmem cache
     is created with SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU the free pointer must be
     located outside of the object because the cache doesn't know what
     part of the memory can safely be overwritten as it may be needed to
     prevent object recycling.

     That has the consequence that SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU may end up
     adding a new cacheline.

     So this also contains work to add a new kmem_cache_create_rcu()
     function that allows the caller to specify an offset where the
     freelist pointer is supposed to be placed. Thus avoiding the
     implicit addition of a fourth cacheline.

   - And finally this removes the f_version member in struct file.

     The f_version member isn't particularly well-defined. It is mainly
     used as a cookie to detect concurrent seeks when iterating
     directories. But it is also abused by some subsystems for
     completely unrelated things.

     It is mostly a directory and filesystem specific thing that doesn't
     really need to live in struct file and with its wonky semantics it
     really lacks a specific function.

     For pipes, f_version is (ab)used to defer poll notifications until
     a write has happened. And struct pipe_inode_info is used by
     multiple struct files in their -&gt;private_data so there's no chance
     of pushing that down into file-&gt;private_data without introducing
     another pointer indirection.

     But pipes don't rely on f_pos_lock so this adds a union into struct
     file encompassing f_pos_lock and a pipe specific f_pipe member that
     pipes can use. This union of course can be extended to other file
     types and is similar to what we do in struct inode already"

* tag 'vfs-6.12.file' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (26 commits)
  fs: remove f_version
  pipe: use f_pipe
  fs: add f_pipe
  ubifs: store cookie in private data
  ufs: store cookie in private data
  udf: store cookie in private data
  proc: store cookie in private data
  ocfs2: store cookie in private data
  input: remove f_version abuse
  ext4: store cookie in private data
  ext2: store cookie in private data
  affs: store cookie in private data
  fs: add generic_llseek_cookie()
  fs: use must_set_pos()
  fs: add must_set_pos()
  fs: add vfs_setpos_cookie()
  s390: remove unused f_version
  ceph: remove unused f_version
  adi: remove unused f_version
  mm: Removed @freeptr_offset to prevent doc warning
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smackfs: Use rcu_assign_pointer() to ensure safe assignment in smk_set_cipso</title>
<updated>2024-09-03T15:37:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiawei Ye</name>
<email>jiawei.ye@foxmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-02T08:47:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=2749749afa071f8a0e405605de9da615e771a7ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2749749afa071f8a0e405605de9da615e771a7ce</id>
<content type='text'>
In the `smk_set_cipso` function, the `skp-&gt;smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat`
field is directly assigned to a new value without using the appropriate
RCU pointer assignment functions. According to RCU usage rules, this is
illegal and can lead to unpredictable behavior, including data
inconsistencies and impossible-to-diagnose memory corruption issues.

This possible bug was identified using a static analysis tool developed
by myself, specifically designed to detect RCU-related issues.

To address this, the assignment is now done using rcu_assign_pointer(),
which ensures that the pointer assignment is done safely, with the
necessary memory barriers and synchronization. This change prevents
potential RCU dereference issues by ensuring that the `cat` field is
safely updated while still adhering to RCU's requirements.

Fixes: 0817534ff9ea ("smackfs: Fix use-after-free in netlbl_catmap_walk()")
Signed-off-by: Jiawei Ye &lt;jiawei.ye@foxmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook</title>
<updated>2024-08-28T23:12:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Scott Mayhew</name>
<email>smayhew@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-28T19:51:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=76a0e79bc84f466999fa501fce5bf7a07641b8a7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:76a0e79bc84f466999fa501fce5bf7a07641b8a7</id>
<content type='text'>
Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to
change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is
exported with root squashing enabled.

The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states:

 *  This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
 *  is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate
 *  permission checks.

nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and
nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks
that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do.

Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(),
simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to
__vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked().  This
fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to
recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change
its security label.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Marek Gresko &lt;marek.gresko@protonmail.com&gt;
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218809
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew &lt;smayhew@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>file: reclaim 24 bytes from f_owner</title>
<updated>2024-08-28T11:05:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-09T16:00:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=1934b212615dc617ac84fc306333ab2b9fc3b04f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1934b212615dc617ac84fc306333ab2b9fc3b04f</id>
<content type='text'>
We do embedd struct fown_struct into struct file letting it take up 32
bytes in total. We could tweak struct fown_struct to be more compact but
really it shouldn't even be embedded in struct file in the first place.

Instead, actual users of struct fown_struct should allocate the struct
on demand. This frees up 24 bytes in struct file.

That will have some potentially user-visible changes for the ownership
fcntl()s. Some of them can now fail due to allocation failures.
Practically, that probably will almost never happen as the allocations
are small and they only happen once per file.

The fown_struct is used during kill_fasync() which is used by e.g.,
pipes to generate a SIGIO signal. Sending of such signals is conditional
on userspace having set an owner for the file using one of the F_OWNER
fcntl()s. Such users will be unaffected if struct fown_struct is
allocated during the fcntl() call.

There are a few subsystems that call __f_setown() expecting
file-&gt;f_owner to be allocated:

(1) tun devices
    file-&gt;f_op-&gt;fasync::tun_chr_fasync()
    -&gt; __f_setown()

    There are no callers of tun_chr_fasync().

(2) tty devices

    file-&gt;f_op-&gt;fasync::tty_fasync()
    -&gt; __tty_fasync()
       -&gt; __f_setown()

    tty_fasync() has no additional callers but __tty_fasync() has. Note
    that __tty_fasync() only calls __f_setown() if the @on argument is
    true. It's called from:

    file-&gt;f_op-&gt;release::tty_release()
    -&gt; tty_release()
       -&gt; __tty_fasync()
          -&gt; __f_setown()

    tty_release() calls __tty_fasync() with @on false
    =&gt; __f_setown() is never called from tty_release().
       =&gt; All callers of tty_release() are safe as well.

    file-&gt;f_op-&gt;release::tty_open()
    -&gt; tty_release()
       -&gt; __tty_fasync()
          -&gt; __f_setown()

    __tty_hangup() calls __tty_fasync() with @on false
    =&gt; __f_setown() is never called from tty_release().
       =&gt; All callers of __tty_hangup() are safe as well.

From the callchains it's obvious that (1) and (2) end up getting called
via file-&gt;f_op-&gt;fasync(). That can happen either through the F_SETFL
fcntl() with the FASYNC flag raised or via the FIOASYNC ioctl(). If
FASYNC is requested and the file isn't already FASYNC then
file-&gt;f_op-&gt;fasync() is called with @on true which ends up causing both
(1) and (2) to call __f_setown().

(1) and (2) are the only subsystems that call __f_setown() from the
file-&gt;f_op-&gt;fasync() handler. So both (1) and (2) have been updated to
allocate a struct fown_struct prior to calling fasync_helper() to
register with the fasync infrastructure. That's safe as they both call
fasync_helper() which also does allocations if @on is true.

The other interesting case are file leases:

(3) file leases
    lease_manager_ops-&gt;lm_setup::lease_setup()
    -&gt; __f_setown()

    Which in turn is called from:

    generic_add_lease()
    -&gt; lease_manager_ops-&gt;lm_setup::lease_setup()
       -&gt; __f_setown()

So here again we can simply make generic_add_lease() allocate struct
fown_struct prior to the lease_manager_ops-&gt;lm_setup::lease_setup()
which happens under a spinlock.

With that the two remaining subsystems that call __f_setown() are:

(4) dnotify
(5) sockets

Both have their own custom ioctls to set struct fown_struct and both
have been converted to allocate a struct fown_struct on demand from
their respective ioctls.

Interactions with O_PATH are fine as well e.g., when opening a /dev/tty
as O_PATH then no file-&gt;f_op-&gt;open() happens thus no file-&gt;f_owner is
allocated. That's fine as no file operation will be set for those and
the device has never been opened. fcntl()s called on such things will
just allocate a -&gt;f_owner on demand. Although I have zero idea why'd you
care about f_owner on an O_PATH fd.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240813-work-f_owner-v2-1-4e9343a79f9f@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: smack: Fix indentation in smack_netfilter.c</title>
<updated>2024-08-22T20:38:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>GiSeong Ji</name>
<email>jiggyjiggy0323@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-22T09:18:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=eabc10e60dac08b9f4f05872d785532d0856e09f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eabc10e60dac08b9f4f05872d785532d0856e09f</id>
<content type='text'>
Aligned parameters in the function declaration of smack_ip_output
to adhere to the Linux kernel coding style guidelines.

The parameters of the smack_ip_output function were previously misaligned,
with the second and third parameters not aligned under the first parameter.
This change corrects the indentation, improving code readability and
maintaining consistency with the rest of the codebase.

Signed-off-by: GiSeong Ji &lt;jiggyjiggy0323@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_copy_up_xattr</title>
<updated>2024-07-31T18:47:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Xu Kuohai</name>
<email>xukuohai@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-24T02:06:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=924e19c39e8f0bbd581ab8a049f95a0ed02235b1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:924e19c39e8f0bbd581ab8a049f95a0ed02235b1</id>
<content type='text'>
To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
hook inode_copy_up_xattr to 0 or a negative error code.

Before:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, 1 when
  discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or any
  other negative error code otherwise.

After:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, *-ECANCELED*
  when discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or
  any other negative error code otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai &lt;xukuohai@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
