<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/arch/arm64/kernel, branch v6.12.1</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel with personal config changes for arch linux</subtitle>
<id>https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/atom?h=v6.12.1</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/atom?h=v6.12.1'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/'/>
<updated>2024-11-08T17:19:58Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T17:19:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-08T17:19:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=9ea7edac83630a9e8a05042b8750eaa10ecb6a38'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9ea7edac83630a9e8a05042b8750eaa10ecb6a38</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull arm64 fixes from Will Deacon:
 "Here is a (hopefully) final round of arm64 fixes for 6.12 that address
  some user-visible floating point register corruption. Both of the
  Marks have been working on this for a couple of weeks and we've ended
  up in a position where SVE is solid but SME still has enough pending
  issues that the most pragmatic solution for the release and stable
  backports is to disable the feature. Yes, it's a shame, but the
  hardware is rare as hen's teeth at the moment and we're better off
  getting back to a known good state before fixing it all properly.
  We're also improving the selftests for 6.13 to help avoid merging
  broken code in the future.

  Anyway, the good news is that we're removing a lot more code than
  we're adding.

  Summary:

   - Fix handling of SVE traps from userspace on preemptible kernels
     when converting the saved floating point state into SVE state.

   - Remove broken support for the SMCCCv1.3 "SVE discard hint"
     optimisation.

   - Disable SME support, as the current support code suffers from
     numerous issues around signal delivery, ptrace access and
     context-switch which can lead to user-visible corruption of the
     register state"

* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
  arm64: Kconfig: Make SME depend on BROKEN for now
  arm64: smccc: Remove broken support for SMCCCv1.3 SVE discard hint
  arm64/sve: Discard stale CPU state when handling SVE traps
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: smccc: Remove broken support for SMCCCv1.3 SVE discard hint</title>
<updated>2024-11-07T11:18:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-06T16:04:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=8c462d56487e3abdbf8a61cedfe7c795a54f4a78'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8c462d56487e3abdbf8a61cedfe7c795a54f4a78</id>
<content type='text'>
SMCCCv1.3 added a hint bit which callers can set in an SMCCC function ID
(AKA "FID") to indicate that it is acceptable for the SMCCC
implementation to discard SVE and/or SME state over a specific SMCCC
call. The kernel support for using this hint is broken and SMCCC calls
may clobber the SVE and/or SME state of arbitrary tasks, though FPSIMD
state is unaffected.

The kernel support is intended to use the hint when there is no SVE or
SME state to save, and to do this it checks whether TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE
is set or TIF_SVE is clear in assembly code:

|        ldr     &lt;flags&gt;, [&lt;current_task&gt;, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
|        tbnz    &lt;flags&gt;, #TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, 1f   // Any live FP state?
|        tbnz    &lt;flags&gt;, #TIF_SVE, 2f               // Does that state include SVE?
|
| 1:     orr     &lt;fid&gt;, &lt;fid&gt;, ARM_SMCCC_1_3_SVE_HINT
| 2:
|        &lt;&lt; SMCCC call using FID &gt;&gt;

This is not safe as-is:

(1) SMCCC calls can be made in a preemptible context and preemption can
    result in TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE being set or cleared at arbitrary
    points in time. Thus checking for TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE provides no
    guarantee.

(2) TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE only indicates that the live FP/SVE/SME state in
    the CPU does not belong to the current task, and does not indicate
    that clobbering this state is acceptable.

    When the live CPU state is clobbered it is necessary to update
    fpsimd_last_state.st to ensure that a subsequent context switch will
    reload FP/SVE/SME state from memory rather than consuming the
    clobbered state. This and the SMCCC call itself must happen in a
    critical section with preemption disabled to avoid races.

(3) Live SVE/SME state can exist with TIF_SVE clear (e.g. with only
    TIF_SME set), and checking TIF_SVE alone is insufficient.

Remove the broken support for the SMCCCv1.3 SVE saving hint. This is
effectively a revert of commits:

* cfa7ff959a78 ("arm64: smccc: Support SMCCC v1.3 SVE register saving hint")
* a7c3acca5380 ("arm64: smccc: Save lr before calling __arm_smccc_sve_check()")

... leaving behind the ARM_SMCCC_VERSION_1_3 and ARM_SMCCC_1_3_SVE_HINT
definitions, since these are simply definitions from the SMCCC
specification, and the latter is used in KVM via ARM_SMCCC_CALL_HINTS.

If we want to bring this back in future, we'll probably want to handle
this logic in C where we can use all the usual FPSIMD/SVE/SME helper
functions, and that'll likely require some rework of the SMCCC code
and/or its callers.

Fixes: cfa7ff959a78 ("arm64: smccc: Support SMCCC v1.3 SVE register saving hint")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241106160448.2712997-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64/sve: Discard stale CPU state when handling SVE traps</title>
<updated>2024-11-06T13:49:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Brown</name>
<email>broonie@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-30T20:23:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=751ecf6afd6568adc98f2a6052315552c0483d18'/>
<id>urn:sha1:751ecf6afd6568adc98f2a6052315552c0483d18</id>
<content type='text'>
The logic for handling SVE traps manipulates saved FPSIMD/SVE state
incorrectly, and a race with preemption can result in a task having
TIF_SVE set and TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE clear even though the live CPU state
is stale (e.g. with SVE traps enabled). This has been observed to result
in warnings from do_sve_acc() where SVE traps are not expected while
TIF_SVE is set:

|         if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_SVE))
|                 WARN_ON(1); /* SVE access shouldn't have trapped */

Warnings of this form have been reported intermittently, e.g.

  https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/CA+G9fYtEGe_DhY2Ms7+L7NKsLYUomGsgqpdBj+QwDLeSg=JhGg@mail.gmail.com/
  https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/000000000000511e9a060ce5a45c@google.com/

The race can occur when the SVE trap handler is preempted before and
after manipulating the saved FPSIMD/SVE state, starting and ending on
the same CPU, e.g.

| void do_sve_acc(unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
| {
|         // Trap on CPU 0 with TIF_SVE clear, SVE traps enabled
|         // task-&gt;fpsimd_cpu is 0.
|         // per_cpu_ptr(&amp;fpsimd_last_state, 0) is task.
|
|         ...
|
|         // Preempted; migrated from CPU 0 to CPU 1.
|         // TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is set.
|
|         get_cpu_fpsimd_context();
|
|         if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_SVE))
|                 WARN_ON(1); /* SVE access shouldn't have trapped */
|
|         sve_init_regs() {
|                 if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE)) {
|                         ...
|                 } else {
|                         fpsimd_to_sve(current);
|                         current-&gt;thread.fp_type = FP_STATE_SVE;
|                 }
|         }
|
|         put_cpu_fpsimd_context();
|
|         // Preempted; migrated from CPU 1 to CPU 0.
|         // task-&gt;fpsimd_cpu is still 0
|         // If per_cpu_ptr(&amp;fpsimd_last_state, 0) is still task then:
|         // - Stale HW state is reused (with SVE traps enabled)
|         // - TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is cleared
|         // - A return to userspace skips HW state restore
| }

Fix the case where the state is not live and TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is set
by calling fpsimd_flush_task_state() to detach from the saved CPU
state. This ensures that a subsequent context switch will not reuse the
stale CPU state, and will instead set TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, forcing the
new state to be reloaded from memory prior to a return to userspace.

Fixes: cccb78ce89c4 ("arm64/sve: Rework SVE access trap to convert state in registers")
Reported-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241030-arm64-fpsimd-foreign-flush-v1-1-bd7bd66905a2@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux</title>
<updated>2024-11-01T17:54:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-01T17:54:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=3dfffd506eff69e4246a0f1760e67dd90f9bbb32'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3dfffd506eff69e4246a0f1760e67dd90f9bbb32</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull arm64 fixes from Will Deacon:
 "The important one is a change to the way in which we handle protection
  keys around signal delivery so that we're more closely aligned with
  the x86 behaviour, however there is also a revert of the previous fix
  to disable software tag-based KASAN with GCC, since a workaround
  materialised shortly afterwards.

  I'd love to say we're done with 6.12, but we're aware of some
  longstanding fpsimd register corruption issues that we're almost at
  the bottom of resolving.

  Summary:

   - Fix handling of POR_EL0 during signal delivery so that pushing the
     signal context doesn't fail based on the pkey configuration of the
     interrupted context and align our user-visible behaviour with that
     of x86.

   - Fix a bogus pointer being passed to the CPU hotplug code from the
     Arm SDEI driver.

   - Re-enable software tag-based KASAN with GCC by using an alternative
     implementation of '__no_sanitize_address'"

* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
  arm64: signal: Improve POR_EL0 handling to avoid uaccess failures
  firmware: arm_sdei: Fix the input parameter of cpuhp_remove_state()
  Revert "kasan: Disable Software Tag-Based KASAN with GCC"
  kasan: Fix Software Tag-Based KASAN with GCC
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: signal: Improve POR_EL0 handling to avoid uaccess failures</title>
<updated>2024-10-29T17:59:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kevin Brodsky</name>
<email>kevin.brodsky@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-29T14:45:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=2e8a1acea8597ff42189ea94f0a63fa58640223d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2e8a1acea8597ff42189ea94f0a63fa58640223d</id>
<content type='text'>
Reset POR_EL0 to "allow all" before writing the signal frame, preventing
spurious uaccess failures.

When POE is supported, the POR_EL0 register constrains memory
accesses based on the target page's POIndex (pkey). This raises the
question: what constraints should apply to a signal handler? The
current answer is that POR_EL0 is reset to POR_EL0_INIT when
invoking the handler, giving it full access to POIndex 0. This is in
line with x86's MPK support and remains unchanged.

This is only part of the story, though. POR_EL0 constrains all
unprivileged memory accesses, meaning that uaccess routines such as
put_user() are also impacted. As a result POR_EL0 may prevent the
signal frame from being written to the signal stack (ultimately
causing a SIGSEGV). This is especially concerning when an alternate
signal stack is used, because userspace may want to prevent access
to it outside of signal handlers. There is currently no provision
for that: POR_EL0 is reset after writing to the stack, and
POR_EL0_INIT only enables access to POIndex 0.

This patch ensures that POR_EL0 is reset to its most permissive
state before the signal stack is accessed. Once the signal frame has
been fully written, POR_EL0 is still set to POR_EL0_INIT - it is up
to the signal handler to enable access to additional pkeys if
needed. As to sigreturn(), it expects having access to the stack
like any other syscall; we only need to ensure that POR_EL0 is
restored from the signal frame after all uaccess calls. This
approach is in line with the recent x86/pkeys series [1].

Resetting POR_EL0 early introduces some complications, in that we
can no longer read the register directly in preserve_poe_context().
This is addressed by introducing a struct (user_access_state)
and helpers to manage any such register impacting user accesses
(uaccess and accesses in userspace). Things look like this on signal
delivery:

1. Save original POR_EL0 into struct [save_reset_user_access_state()]
2. Set POR_EL0 to "allow all"  [save_reset_user_access_state()]
3. Create signal frame
4. Write saved POR_EL0 value to the signal frame [preserve_poe_context()]
5. Finalise signal frame
6. If all operations succeeded:
  a. Set POR_EL0 to POR_EL0_INIT [set_handler_user_access_state()]
  b. Else reset POR_EL0 to its original value [restore_user_access_state()]

If any step fails when setting up the signal frame, the process will
be sent a SIGSEGV, which it may be able to handle. Step 6.b ensures
that the original POR_EL0 is saved in the signal frame when
delivering that SIGSEGV (so that the original value is restored by
sigreturn).

The return path (sys_rt_sigreturn) doesn't strictly require any change
since restore_poe_context() is already called last. However, to
avoid uaccess calls being accidentally added after that point, we
use the same approach as in the delivery path, i.e. separating
uaccess from writing to the register:

1. Read saved POR_EL0 value from the signal frame [restore_poe_context()]
2. Set POR_EL0 to the saved value [restore_user_access_state()]

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240802061318.2140081-1-aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com/

Fixes: 9160f7e909e1 ("arm64: add POE signal support")
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky &lt;kevin.brodsky@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241029144539.111155-2-kevin.brodsky@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2024-10-21T18:22:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-21T18:22:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=d129377639907fce7e0a27990e590e4661d3ee02'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d129377639907fce7e0a27990e590e4661d3ee02</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM64:

   - Fix the guest view of the ID registers, making the relevant fields
     writable from userspace (affecting ID_AA64DFR0_EL1 and
     ID_AA64PFR1_EL1)

   - Correcly expose S1PIE to guests, fixing a regression introduced in
     6.12-rc1 with the S1POE support

   - Fix the recycling of stage-2 shadow MMUs by tracking the context
     (are we allowed to block or not) as well as the recycling state

   - Address a couple of issues with the vgic when userspace
     misconfigures the emulation, resulting in various splats. Headaches
     courtesy of our Syzkaller friends

   - Stop wasting space in the HYP idmap, as we are dangerously close to
     the 4kB limit, and this has already exploded in -next

   - Fix another race in vgic_init()

   - Fix a UBSAN error when faking the cache topology with MTE enabled

  RISCV:

   - RISCV: KVM: use raw_spinlock for critical section in imsic

  x86:

   - A bandaid for lack of XCR0 setup in selftests, which causes trouble
     if the compiler is configured to have x86-64-v3 (with AVX) as the
     default ISA. Proper XCR0 setup will come in the next merge window.

   - Fix an issue where KVM would not ignore low bits of the nested CR3
     and potentially leak up to 31 bytes out of the guest memory's
     bounds

   - Fix case in which an out-of-date cached value for the segments
     could by returned by KVM_GET_SREGS.

   - More cleanups for KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL

   - Override MTRR state for KVM confidential guests, making it WB by
     default as is already the case for Hyper-V guests.

  Generic:

   - Remove a couple of unused functions"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (27 commits)
  RISCV: KVM: use raw_spinlock for critical section in imsic
  KVM: selftests: Fix out-of-bounds reads in CPUID test's array lookups
  KVM: selftests: x86: Avoid using SSE/AVX instructions
  KVM: nSVM: Ignore nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory
  KVM: VMX: reset the segment cache after segment init in vmx_vcpu_reset()
  KVM: x86: Clean up documentation for KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL
  KVM: x86/mmu: Add lockdep assert to enforce safe usage of kvm_unmap_gfn_range()
  KVM: x86/mmu: Zap only SPs that shadow gPTEs when deleting memslot
  x86/kvm: Override default caching mode for SEV-SNP and TDX
  KVM: Remove unused kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn_atomic
  KVM: Remove unused kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn
  KVM: arm64: Ensure vgic_ready() is ordered against MMIO registration
  KVM: arm64: vgic: Don't check for vgic_ready() when setting NR_IRQS
  KVM: arm64: Fix shift-out-of-bounds bug
  KVM: arm64: Shave a few bytes from the EL2 idmap code
  KVM: arm64: Don't eagerly teardown the vgic on init error
  KVM: arm64: Expose S1PIE to guests
  KVM: arm64: nv: Clarify safety of allowing TLBI unmaps to reschedule
  KVM: arm64: nv: Punt stage-2 recycling to a vCPU request
  KVM: arm64: nv: Do not block when unmapping stage-2 if disallowed
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: arm64: Shave a few bytes from the EL2 idmap code</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T08:17:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Zyngier</name>
<email>maz@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-10T15:13:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=afa9b48f327c9ef36bfba4c643a29385a633252b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:afa9b48f327c9ef36bfba4c643a29385a633252b</id>
<content type='text'>
Our idmap is becoming too big, to the point where it doesn't fit in
a 4kB page anymore.

There are some low-hanging fruits though, such as the el2_init_state
horror that is expanded 3 times in the kernel. Let's at least limit
ourselves to two copies, which makes the kernel link again.

At some point, we'll have to have a better way of doing this.

Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009204903.GA3353168@thelio-3990X
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: set POR_EL0 for kernel threads</title>
<updated>2024-10-14T16:22:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joey Gouly</name>
<email>joey.gouly@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-01T13:36:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=e3e85271330b18f487ab3032ea9ca0601efeafaf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e3e85271330b18f487ab3032ea9ca0601efeafaf</id>
<content type='text'>
Restrict kernel threads to only have RWX overlays for pkey 0.  This matches
what arch/x86 does, by defaulting to a restrictive PKRU.

Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly &lt;joey.gouly@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kevin Brodsky &lt;Kevin.Brodsky@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001133618.1547996-2-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: probes: Fix uprobes for big-endian kernels</title>
<updated>2024-10-09T15:56:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-08T15:58:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7</id>
<content type='text'>
The arm64 uprobes code is broken for big-endian kernels as it doesn't
convert the in-memory instruction encoding (which is always
little-endian) into the kernel's native endianness before analyzing and
simulating instructions. This may result in a few distinct problems:

* The kernel may may erroneously reject probing an instruction which can
  safely be probed.

* The kernel may erroneously erroneously permit stepping an
  instruction out-of-line when that instruction cannot be stepped
  out-of-line safely.

* The kernel may erroneously simulate instruction incorrectly dur to
  interpretting the byte-swapped encoding.

The endianness mismatch isn't caught by the compiler or sparse because:

* The arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields are encoded as arrays of u8, so
  the compiler and sparse have no idea these contain a little-endian
  32-bit value. The core uprobes code populates these with a memcpy()
  which similarly does not handle endianness.

* While the uprobe_opcode_t type is an alias for __le32, both
  arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() and arch_uprobe_skip_sstep() cast from u8[]
  to the similarly-named probe_opcode_t, which is an alias for u32.
  Hence there is no endianness conversion warning.

Fix this by changing the arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields to __le32 and
adding the appropriate __le32_to_cpu() conversions prior to consuming
the instruction encoding. The core uprobes copies these fields as opaque
ranges of bytes, and so is unaffected by this change.

At the same time, remove MAX_UINSN_BYTES and consistently use
AARCH64_INSN_SIZE for clarity.

Tested with the following:

| #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
| #include &lt;stdbool.h&gt;
|
| #define noinline __attribute__((noinline))
|
| static noinline void *adrp_self(void)
| {
|         void *addr;
|
|         asm volatile(
|         "       adrp    %x0, adrp_self\n"
|         "       add     %x0, %x0, :lo12:adrp_self\n"
|         : "=r" (addr));
| }
|
|
| int main(int argc, char *argv)
| {
|         void *ptr = adrp_self();
|         bool equal = (ptr == adrp_self);
|
|         printf("adrp_self   =&gt; %p\n"
|                "adrp_self() =&gt; %p\n"
|                "%s\n",
|                adrp_self, ptr, equal ? "EQUAL" : "NOT EQUAL");
|
|         return 0;
| }

.... where the adrp_self() function was compiled to:

| 00000000004007e0 &lt;adrp_self&gt;:
|   4007e0:       90000000        adrp    x0, 400000 &lt;__ehdr_start&gt;
|   4007e4:       911f8000        add     x0, x0, #0x7e0
|   4007e8:       d65f03c0        ret

Before this patch, the ADRP is not recognized, and is assumed to be
steppable, resulting in corruption of the result:

| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self   =&gt; 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() =&gt; 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self   =&gt; 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() =&gt; 0xffffffffff7e0
| NOT EQUAL

After this patch, the ADRP is correctly recognized and simulated:

| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self   =&gt; 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() =&gt; 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| #
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self   =&gt; 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() =&gt; 0x4007e0
| EQUAL

Fixes: 9842ceae9fa8 ("arm64: Add uprobe support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008155851.801546-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: probes: Fix simulate_ldr*_literal()</title>
<updated>2024-10-09T15:56:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-08T15:58:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tablaster.dev/blaster4385/linux-IllusionX/commit/?id=50f813e57601c22b6f26ced3193b9b94d70a2640'/>
<id>urn:sha1:50f813e57601c22b6f26ced3193b9b94d70a2640</id>
<content type='text'>
The simulate_ldr_literal() code always loads a 64-bit quantity, and when
simulating a 32-bit load into a 'W' register, it discards the most
significant 32 bits. For big-endian kernels this means that the relevant
bits are discarded, and the value returned is the the subsequent 32 bits
in memory (i.e. the value at addr + 4).

Additionally, simulate_ldr_literal() and simulate_ldrsw_literal() use a
plain C load, which the compiler may tear or elide (e.g. if the target
is the zero register). Today this doesn't happen to matter, but it may
matter in future if trampoline code uses a LDR (literal) or LDRSW
(literal).

Update simulate_ldr_literal() and simulate_ldrsw_literal() to use an
appropriately-sized READ_ONCE() to perform the access, which avoids
these problems.

Fixes: 39a67d49ba35 ("arm64: kprobes instruction simulation support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008155851.801546-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
