Commit graph

448 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds
99a6740f88 Smack LSM changes for Linux 5.10
Two kernel test robot suggested clean-ups.
 Teach Smack to use the IPv4 netlabel cache.
 This results in a 12-14% improvement on TCP benchmarks.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJLBAABCAA1FiEEC+9tH1YyUwIQzUIeOKUVfIxDyBEFAl+EkO0XHGNhc2V5QHNj
 aGF1Zmxlci1jYS5jb20ACgkQOKUVfIxDyBFmWBAAqJzkYd1Pd3g0vewZXGe5mRxs
 Qqt6i3HMJ7yAPIJN3445DyHUB6Sad2jmGXGullROfUtJYFkTbxqIj0XT+RUrJFap
 qf54Sgzt/ucNTvZ45s5mV6iYdL2ol7NSB9kQOMVMV0BZf2GXknYv0/rP23wI/upo
 Ylk41UYZNE5RDwoH90sy9aUUJ6VHhMYJOj33aUXz6rwaO1Ck6xvu1tCDudJpERkU
 kUmgpYzkNVGmg+GQIOT/xr7C7LRFxfnbSX0UL5TYPEKC23tYfkSBoClgCpNSSYSh
 3+7+YNRjMjxuKYJEPTUliDeDMQLxQB/3tLMD2c92nADtTJyRkTZelSgFhDFiOW0L
 ln5otQ0aGuDvkmLmBLk/jcq3eKctztqJIQdxQG9K3kJdohz1t/onJJt3cwuWZIo5
 T8dKz/mhga11u0ii6Zk+ecDdpagcxrQ8FDKcjI1tgXtTKAEvjfhVwAbj/9X55BGY
 T3M52b6RuE/ZRPD/BKXMaAUTNI0jwYbJyZYm+5GY/fk6lg0CRNaPBTVr0hj1Ia4P
 7akSD1gYUSTblFvjGa+hBsnmUDHo7Htl+kXJ3v6U8bSPFgFsO7hLbZJR6nRbxDvV
 k/KejR7RsORkbTFczWGngTKGI2UUNgMJf3Km9WU5bLqU3PpM32Hlal3CLMm3dQTB
 /3Gfl6aCy7Ct72tNilw=
 =EgBn
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.10' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next

Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
 "Two minor fixes and one performance enhancement to Smack. The
  performance improvement is significant and the new code is more like
  its counterpart in SELinux.

   - Two kernel test robot suggested clean-ups.

   - Teach Smack to use the IPv4 netlabel cache. This results in a
     12-14% improvement on TCP benchmarks"

* tag 'Smack-for-5.10' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
  Smack: Remove unnecessary variable initialization
  Smack: Fix build when NETWORK_SECMARK is not set
  Smack: Use the netlabel cache
  Smack: Set socket labels only once
  Smack: Consolidate uses of secmark into a function
2020-10-13 16:18:51 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
edd615371b Smack: Remove unnecessary variable initialization
The initialization of rc in smack_from_netlbl() is pointless.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-10-05 14:20:51 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
bf0afe673b Smack: Fix build when NETWORK_SECMARK is not set
Use proper conditional compilation for the secmark field in
the network skb.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-09-22 14:59:31 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
322dd63c7f Smack: Use the netlabel cache
Utilize the Netlabel cache mechanism for incoming packet matching.
Refactor the initialization of secattr structures, as it was being
done in two places.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-09-11 15:31:31 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
a2af031885 Smack: Set socket labels only once
Refactor the IP send checks so that the netlabel value
is set only when necessary, not on every send. Some functions
get renamed as the changes made the old name misleading.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-09-11 15:31:30 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
36be81293d Smack: Consolidate uses of secmark into a function
Add a function smack_from_skb() that returns the Smack label
identified by a network secmark. Replace the explicit uses of
the secmark with this function.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-09-11 15:31:30 -07:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva
df561f6688 treewide: Use fallthrough pseudo-keyword
Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
2020-08-23 17:36:59 -05:00
Dan Carpenter
42a2df3e82 Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()
We have an upper bound on "maplevel" but forgot to check for negative
values.

Fixes: e114e47377 ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-07-27 13:35:12 -07:00
Dan Carpenter
a6bd4f6d9b Smack: fix another vsscanf out of bounds
This is similar to commit 84e99e58e8 ("Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in
vsscanf") where we added a bounds check on "rule".

Reported-by: syzbot+a22c6092d003d6fe1122@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: f7112e6c9a ("Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-07-27 13:35:03 -07:00
Eric Biggers
beb4ee6770 Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self()
smk_write_relabel_self() frees memory from the task's credentials with
no locking, which can easily cause a use-after-free because multiple
tasks can share the same credentials structure.

Fix this by using prepare_creds() and commit_creds() to correctly modify
the task's credentials.

Reproducer for "BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self":

	#include <fcntl.h>
	#include <pthread.h>
	#include <unistd.h>

	static void *thrproc(void *arg)
	{
		int fd = open("/sys/fs/smackfs/relabel-self", O_WRONLY);
		for (;;) write(fd, "foo", 3);
	}

	int main()
	{
		pthread_t t;
		pthread_create(&t, NULL, thrproc, NULL);
		thrproc(NULL);
	}

Reported-by: syzbot+e6416dabb497a650da40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 38416e5393 ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-07-14 11:19:58 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
6c32978414 Notifications over pipes + Keyring notifications
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEqG5UsNXhtOCrfGQP+7dXa6fLC2sFAl7U/i8ACgkQ+7dXa6fL
 C2u2eg/+Oy6ybq0hPovYVkFI9WIG7ZCz7w9Q6BEnfYMqqn3dnfJxKQ3l4pnQEOWw
 f4QfvpvevsYfMtOJkYcG6s66rQgbFdqc5TEyBBy0QNp3acRolN7IXkcopvv9xOpQ
 JxedpbFG1PTFLWjvBpyjlrUPouwLzq2FXAf1Ox0ZIMw6165mYOMWoli1VL8dh0A0
 Ai7JUB0WrvTNbrwhV413obIzXT/rPCdcrgbQcgrrLPex8lQ47ZAE9bq6k4q5HiwK
 KRzEqkQgnzId6cCNTFBfkTWsx89zZunz7jkfM5yx30MvdAtPSxvvpfIPdZRZkXsP
 E2K9Fk1/6OQZTC0Op3Pi/bt+hVG/mD1p0sQUDgo2MO3qlSS+5mMkR8h3mJEgwK12
 72P4YfOJkuAy2z3v4lL0GYdUDAZY6i6G8TMxERKu/a9O3VjTWICDOyBUS6F8YEAK
 C7HlbZxAEOKTVK0BTDTeEUBwSeDrBbvH6MnRlZCG5g1Fos2aWP0udhjiX8IfZLO7
 GN6nWBvK1fYzfsUczdhgnoCzQs3suoDo04HnsTPGJ8De52T4x2RsjV+gPx0nrNAq
 eWChl1JvMWsY2B3GLnl9XQz4NNN+EreKEkk+PULDGllrArrPsp5Vnhb9FJO1PVCU
 hMDJHohPiXnKbc8f4Bd78OhIvnuoGfJPdM5MtNe2flUKy2a2ops=
 =YTGf
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

Pull notification queue from David Howells:
 "This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
  source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
  changing their attributes.

  Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
  problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:

     https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47

  Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
  cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.

  [ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
    for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
    Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
    this one works first ]

  LSM hooks are included:

   - A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
     not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
     "watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
     LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux & Smack]

   - A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
     particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
     given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
     system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]

  I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
  hooks.

  WHY
  ===

  Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
  kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
  that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
  cache changes.

  However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
  the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
  on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
  be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
  so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
  need to poll.

  DESIGN DECISIONS
  ================

   - The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
     are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:

        pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);

     The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
     like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
     front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&co from accessing
     the pipe.

     [?] Should this be done some other way?  I'd rather not use up a new
         O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
         instead?

     The pipe is then configured::

        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);

     Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().

   - It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
     notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
     kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
     holding pipe->mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
     auditing.

   - sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
     pipes because of the pipe->mutex issue and also because they
     sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
     notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.

   - The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
     means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
     to update the queue pointers.

   - Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
     they can be of varying size.

     This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
     buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
     just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
     specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
     sources.

   - Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
     individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.

   - Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
     bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
     will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
     - and only those that are watching for it.

   - When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
     rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
     insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
     message at an appropriate point later.

   - The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
     to it, using one of:

        keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
        watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
        watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);

     where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
     a tag between 0 and 255.

   - Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
     the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
     be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.

  Things I want to avoid:

   - Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
     network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).

   - Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
     there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
     responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
     namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
     inaccessible inside a container.

   - Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.

  TESTING AND MANPAGES
  ====================

   - The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
     for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
     found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
     the main manpages repository instead.

     If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
     test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
     a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
     for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
     all be checked off to make sure they happened.

        https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch

   - A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
     can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
     Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"

* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
  selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
  keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
  pipe: Add notification lossage handling
  pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
  Add sample notification program
  watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
  security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
  pipe: Add general notification queue support
  pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
  security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
  uapi: General notification queue definitions
2020-06-13 09:56:21 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
15a2bc4dbb Merge branch 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
 "Last cycle for the Nth time I ran into bugs and quality of
  implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily be
  fixed because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been digging
  into exec and cleanup up what I can.

  I don't think I have exec sorted out enough to fix the issues I
  started with but I have made some headway this cycle with 4 sets of
  changes.

   - promised cleanups after introducing exec_update_mutex

   - trivial cleanups for exec

   - control flow simplifications

   - remove the recomputation of bprm->cred

  The net result is code that is a bit easier to understand and work
  with and a decrease in the number of lines of code (if you don't count
  the added tests)"

* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (24 commits)
  exec: Compute file based creds only once
  exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear
  binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix execfd build regression
  selftests/exec: Add binfmt_script regression test
  exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler
  exec: Generic execfd support
  exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC
  exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler
  exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binprm unconditionally
  exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds
  exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds
  exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids
  exec: Set the point of no return sooner
  exec: Move handling of the point of no return to the top level
  exec: Run sync_mm_rss before taking exec_update_mutex
  exec: Fix spelling of search_binary_handler in a comment
  exec: Move the comment from above de_thread to above unshare_sighand
  exec: Rename flush_old_exec begin_new_exec
  exec: Move most of setup_new_exec into flush_old_exec
  exec: In setup_new_exec cache current in the local variable me
  ...
2020-06-04 14:07:08 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
b8bff59926 exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds
Today security_bprm_set_creds has several implementations:
apparmor_bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds,
smack_bprm_set_creds, and tomoyo_bprm_set_creds.

Except for cap_bprm_set_creds they all test bprm->called_set_creds and
return immediately if it is true.  The function cap_bprm_set_creds
ignores bprm->calld_sed_creds entirely.

Create a new LSM hook security_bprm_creds_for_exec that is called just
before prepare_binprm in __do_execve_file, resulting in a LSM hook
that is called exactly once for the entire of exec.  Modify the bits
of security_bprm_set_creds that only want to be called once per exec
into security_bprm_creds_for_exec, leaving only cap_bprm_set_creds
behind.

Remove bprm->called_set_creds all of it's former users have been moved
to security_bprm_creds_for_exec.

Add or upate comments a appropriate to bring them up to date and
to reflect this change.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87v9kszrzh.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # For the LSM and Smack bits
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-20 14:45:31 -05:00
David Howells
a8478a6029 smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
Implement the watch_key security hook in Smack to make sure that a key
grants the caller Read permission in order to set a watch on a key.

Also implement the post_notification security hook to make sure that the
notification source is granted Write permission by the watch queue.

For the moment, the watch_devices security hook is left unimplemented as
it's not obvious what the object should be since the queue is global and
didn't previously exist.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-19 15:47:38 +01:00
David Howells
8c0637e950 keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
Since the meaning of combining the KEY_NEED_* constants is undefined, make
it so that you can't do that by turning them into an enum.

The enum is also given some extra values to represent special
circumstances, such as:

 (1) The '0' value is reserved and causes a warning to trap the parameter
     being unset.

 (2) The key is to be unlinked and we require no permissions on it, only
     the keyring, (this replaces the KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK flag).

 (3) An override due to CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

 (4) An override due to an instantiation token being present.

 (5) The permissions check is being deferred to later key_permission()
     calls.

The extra values give the opportunity for LSMs to audit these situations.

[Note: This really needs overhauling so that lookup_user_key() tells
 key_task_permission() and the LSM what operation is being done and leaves
 it to those functions to decide how to map that onto the available
 permits.  However, I don't really want to make these change in the middle
 of the notifications patchset.]

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
2020-05-19 15:42:22 +01:00
YueHaibing
ef26650a20 Smack: Remove unused inline function smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt
commit a269434d2f ("LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH")
left behind this, remove it.

Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-11 10:25:37 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
4ca7528706 Smack:- Remove redundant inode_smack cache
The inode_smack cache is no longer used.
Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
921bb1cbb3 Smack:- Remove mutex lock "smk_lock" from inode_smack
"smk_lock" mutex is used during inode instantiation in
smack_d_instantiate()function. It has been used to avoid
simultaneous access on same inode security structure.
Since smack related initialization is done only once i.e during
inode creation. If the inode has already been instantiated then
smack_d_instantiate() function just returns without doing
anything.

So it means mutex lock is required only during inode creation.
But since 2 processes can't create same inodes or files
simultaneously. Also linking or some other file operation can't
be done simultaneously when the file is getting created since
file lookup will fail before dentry inode linkup which is done
after smack initialization.
So no mutex lock is required in inode_smack structure.

It will save memory as well as improve some performance.
If 40000 inodes are created in system, it will save 1.5 MB on
32-bit systems & 2.8 MB on 64-bit systems.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
84e99e58e8 Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanf
Add barrier to soob. Return -EOVERFLOW if the buffer
is exceeded.

Suggested-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+bfdd4a2f07be52351350@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Maninder Singh
092c94aed3 smack: remove redundant structure variable from header.
commit afb1cbe374 ("LSM: Infrastructure management
of the inode security") removed usage of smk_rcu,
thus removing it from structure.

Signed-off-by: Maninder Singh <maninder1.s@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Vaneet Narang <v.narang@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Arnd Bergmann
00720f0e7f smack: avoid unused 'sip' variable warning
The mix of IS_ENABLED() and #ifdef checks has left a combination
that causes a warning about an unused variable:

security/smack/smack_lsm.c: In function 'smack_socket_connect':
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2838:24: error: unused variable 'sip' [-Werror=unused-variable]
 2838 |   struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;

Change the code to use C-style checks consistently so the compiler
can handle it correctly.

Fixes: 87fbfffcc8 ("broken ping to ipv6 linklocal addresses on debian buster")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
c9d35ee049 Merge branch 'merge.nfs-fs_parse.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs file system parameter updates from Al Viro:
 "Saner fs_parser.c guts and data structures. The system-wide registry
  of syntax types (string/enum/int32/oct32/.../etc.) is gone and so is
  the horror switch() in fs_parse() that would have to grow another case
  every time something got added to that system-wide registry.

  New syntax types can be added by filesystems easily now, and their
  namespace is that of functions - not of system-wide enum members. IOW,
  they can be shared or kept private and if some turn out to be widely
  useful, we can make them common library helpers, etc., without having
  to do anything whatsoever to fs_parse() itself.

  And we already get that kind of requests - the thing that finally
  pushed me into doing that was "oh, and let's add one for timeouts -
  things like 15s or 2h". If some filesystem really wants that, let them
  do it. Without somebody having to play gatekeeper for the variants
  blessed by direct support in fs_parse(), TYVM.

  Quite a bit of boilerplate is gone. And IMO the data structures make a
  lot more sense now. -200LoC, while we are at it"

* 'merge.nfs-fs_parse.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (25 commits)
  tmpfs: switch to use of invalfc()
  cgroup1: switch to use of errorfc() et.al.
  procfs: switch to use of invalfc()
  hugetlbfs: switch to use of invalfc()
  cramfs: switch to use of errofc() et.al.
  gfs2: switch to use of errorfc() et.al.
  fuse: switch to use errorfc() et.al.
  ceph: use errorfc() and friends instead of spelling the prefix out
  prefix-handling analogues of errorf() and friends
  turn fs_param_is_... into functions
  fs_parse: handle optional arguments sanely
  fs_parse: fold fs_parameter_desc/fs_parameter_spec
  fs_parser: remove fs_parameter_description name field
  add prefix to fs_context->log
  ceph_parse_param(), ceph_parse_mon_ips(): switch to passing fc_log
  new primitive: __fs_parse()
  switch rbd and libceph to p_log-based primitives
  struct p_log, variants of warnf() et.al. taking that one instead
  teach logfc() to handle prefices, give it saner calling conventions
  get rid of cg_invalf()
  ...
2020-02-08 13:26:41 -08:00
Al Viro
d7167b1499 fs_parse: fold fs_parameter_desc/fs_parameter_spec
The former contains nothing but a pointer to an array of the latter...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-02-07 14:48:37 -05:00
Eric Sandeen
96cafb9ccb fs_parser: remove fs_parameter_description name field
Unused now.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-02-07 14:48:36 -05:00
Casey Schaufler
87fbfffcc8
broken ping to ipv6 linklocal addresses on debian buster
I am seeing ping failures to IPv6 linklocal addresses with Debian
buster. Easiest example to reproduce is:

$ ping -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
connect: Invalid argument

$ ping -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
PING ff02::01%eth1(ff02::1%eth1) 56 data bytes
64 bytes from fe80::e0:f9ff:fe0c:37%eth1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.059 ms

git bisect traced the failure to
commit b9ef5513c9 ("smack: Check address length before reading address family")

Arguably ping is being stupid since the buster version is not setting
the address family properly (ping on stretch for example does):

$ strace -e connect ping6 -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
connect(5, {sa_family=AF_UNSPEC,
sa_data="\4\1\0\0\0\0\377\2\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\1\3\0\0\0"}, 28)
= -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)

but the command works fine on kernels prior to this commit, so this is
breakage which goes against the Linux paradigm of "don't break userspace"

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
2020-02-05 14:16:27 -08:00
David Howells
d055b4fb4d pipe: Reduce #inclusion of pipe_fs_i.h
Remove some #inclusions of linux/pipe_fs_i.h that don't seem to be
necessary any more.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-10-23 17:02:34 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
e94f8ccde4 I have four patches for v5.4. Nothing is major. All but one are in
response to mechanically detected potential issues. The remaining
 patch cleans up kernel-doc notations.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJLBAABCAA1FiEEC+9tH1YyUwIQzUIeOKUVfIxDyBEFAl2JI5wXHGNhc2V5QHNj
 aGF1Zmxlci1jYS5jb20ACgkQOKUVfIxDyBEOJQ/5AXdQTd09LMp9jB54u9Usdm71
 +kyJ/KudEja8/pCDDNboiXSfoagRqJ8AbuBAbGLtWLXc3smUcL1mncdfJDJAk88J
 mbIB+qWMls5fC25udD+B2bF2py+eyVJ7dsnvHZg1mS5KUxYBMWVEqgX9zW0EFgNH
 xd2/nB314GhULrfqagxxCd/HpbZ3GV1sM+BkfRPx2zm3gJ8xAuXm1xMMgchP9WqH
 MFJDqk8r1wXCog8OkjQjAYR8zGRJTrP9W6UY9p1L6rp9rtfyPObBuAMLKv3WlXx8
 Jz7idqSDNa49V7W3UrWcjXCunbjyPR7HszuuxhTC+EmB1MRU4IdX9I6ZdAaTuxEM
 jFNwSSjIWRgXkJfLxrDX1ukFPU0JCd8ms7Lzw5YHq2TWt/V/7h4jyUCN8o9BN80r
 7WzqdzT4v+Exc6TpqlpkHiQjJFL4ByEzNt3xNVZ3UFIyxnogVi45kL/78PsqDk/j
 XWqM9bED8dBjM/K3EGqzj0mPCtILLnTm9ZyDvFF75jabf4rk0E354yGcuamoF+eM
 UTT+3NTPQB/kI5i9av8ibGezInVVRQeHuI1/qIaD/Hsr8K7VJbqlB1k/rUxUZaSy
 6g9e0mU2GLgM+eW0EKW0GWpV6/STqzskxu2TW46tobpOykwH9dNKJHhJzx7nEWJi
 +5kMcGIvFCha6922/sM=
 =QV1S
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'smack-for-5.4-rc1' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next

Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
 "Four patches for v5.4. Nothing is major.

  All but one are in response to mechanically detected potential issues.
  The remaining patch cleans up kernel-doc notations"

* tag 'smack-for-5.4-rc1' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
  smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock
  security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
  smack: fix some kernel-doc notations
  Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set
2019-09-23 14:25:45 -07:00
Eric Biggers
e5bfad3d7a
smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock
inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is
called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4.
Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use
GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem
transaction to complete.

Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-09-04 09:37:07 -07:00
Jia-Ju Bai
3f4287e7d9
security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement
on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL:
    if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)

This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases.

But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used:
    ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
    ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);

Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL.

To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb.

These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.

Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-09-04 09:37:07 -07:00
luanshi
a1a07f2234
smack: fix some kernel-doc notations
Fix/add kernel-doc notation and fix typos in security/smack/.

Signed-off-by: Liguang Zhang <zhangliguang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-09-04 09:37:07 -07:00
Jann Horn
3675f052b4
Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set
There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds():
If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be
acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other
->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that
something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it):

 - task A: create task B with fork()
 - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS
 - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some
   conditions
 - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library
 - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH
 - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute
 - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which
   destroys the ptrace relationship)

Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in
bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5663884caa ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-09-04 09:36:57 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
933a90bf4f Merge branch 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro:
 "The first part of mount updates.

  Convert filesystems to use the new mount API"

* 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally
  constify ksys_mount() string arguments
  don't bother with registering rootfs
  init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs()
  vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API
  convenience helper: get_tree_single()
  convenience helper get_tree_nodev()
  vfs: Kill sget_userns()
  ...
2019-07-19 10:42:02 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
028db3e290 Revert "Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs"
This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9c (and thus
effectively commits

   7a1ade8475 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
   2e12256b9a ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")

that the merge brought in).

It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].

The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.

 [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-10 18:43:43 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
0f75ef6a9c Keyrings ACL
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIVAwUAXRyyVvu3V2unywtrAQL3xQ//eifjlELkRAPm2EReWwwahdM+9QL/0bAy
 e8eAzP9EaphQGUhpIzM9Y7Cx+a8XW2xACljY8hEFGyxXhDMoLa35oSoJOeay6vQt
 QcgWnDYsET8Z7HOsFCP3ZQqlbbqfsB6CbIKtZoEkZ8ib7eXpYcy1qTydu7wqrl4A
 AaJalAhlUKKUx9hkGGJTh2xvgmxgSJkxx3cNEWJQ2uGgY/ustBpqqT4iwFDsgA/q
 fcYTQFfNQBsC8/SmvQgxJSc+reUdQdp0z1vd8qjpSdFFcTq1qOtK0qDdz1Bbyl24
 hAxvNM1KKav83C8aF7oHhEwLrkD+XiYKixdEiCJJp+A2i+vy2v8JnfgtFTpTgLNK
 5xu2VmaiWmee9SLCiDIBKE4Ghtkr8DQ/5cKFCwthT8GXgQUtdsdwAaT3bWdCNfRm
 DqgU/AyyXhoHXrUM25tPeF3hZuDn2yy6b1TbKA9GCpu5TtznZIHju40Px/XMIpQH
 8d6s/pg+u/SnkhjYWaTvTcvsQ2FB/vZY/UzAVyosnoMBkVfL4UtAHGbb8FBVj1nf
 Dv5VjSjl4vFjgOr3jygEAeD2cJ7L6jyKbtC/jo4dnOmPrSRShIjvfSU04L3z7FZS
 XFjMmGb2Jj8a7vAGFmsJdwmIXZ1uoTwX56DbpNL88eCgZWFPGKU7TisdIWAmJj8U
 N9wholjHJgw=
 =E3bF
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
 "This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
  based on an internal ACL by the following means:

   - Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
     list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
     Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.

     ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
     on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
     additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
     tags/namespaces.

     Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
     include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
     permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
     a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
     to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
     stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
     acquiring use of possessor permits.

   - Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
     permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
     granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"

* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
  keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
2019-07-08 19:56:57 -07:00
David Howells
5afdd0f1e6 vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API
Convert the smackfs filesystem to the new internal mount API as the old
one will be obsoleted and removed.  This allows greater flexibility in
communication of mount parameters between userspace, the VFS and the
filesystem.

See Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt for more information.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-04 22:01:59 -04:00
David Howells
2e12256b9a keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split.  This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.

============
WHY DO THIS?
============

The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.

For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:

 (1) Changing a key's ownership.

 (2) Changing a key's security information.

 (3) Setting a keyring's restriction.

And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:

 (4) Setting an expiry time.

 (5) Revoking a key.

and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:

 (6) Invalidating a key.

Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.

Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission.  It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.

As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:

 (1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.

 (2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.

 (3) Invalidation.

But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.

Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.


===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============

The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:

 (1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
     changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.

 (2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.

The SEARCH permission is split to create:

 (1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.

 (2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.

 (3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.

The WRITE permission is also split to create:

 (1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
     added, removed and replaced in a keyring.

 (2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely.  This is
     split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.

 (3) REVOKE - see above.


Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together.  An ACE specifies a subject, such as:

 (*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
 (*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
 (*) Group - permitted to the key group
 (*) Everyone - permitted to everyone

Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.

Further subjects may be made available by later patches.

The ACE also specifies a permissions mask.  The set of permissions is now:

	VIEW		Can view the key metadata
	READ		Can read the key content
	WRITE		Can update/modify the key content
	SEARCH		Can find the key by searching/requesting
	LINK		Can make a link to the key
	SET_SECURITY	Can change owner, ACL, expiry
	INVAL		Can invalidate
	REVOKE		Can revoke
	JOIN		Can join this keyring
	CLEAR		Can clear this keyring


The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.

The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.

The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.

The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.

The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.

The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.


======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================

To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.

It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.

SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY.  WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR.  JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.

The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.

It will make the following mappings:

 (1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH

 (2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR

 (3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set

 (4) CLEAR -> WRITE

Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.


=======
TESTING
=======

This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:

 (1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
     returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
     if the type doesn't have ->read().  You still can't actually read the
     key.

 (2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
     work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-27 23:03:07 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
d2912cb15b treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
  published by the free software foundation

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
  published by the free software foundation #

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-19 17:09:55 +02:00
Casey Schaufler
6e7739fc93 Smack: Restore the smackfsdef mount option and add missing prefixes
The 5.1 mount system rework changed the smackfsdef mount option to
smackfsdefault.  This fixes the regression by making smackfsdef treated
the same way as smackfsdefault.

Also fix the smack_param_specs[] to have "smack" prefixes on all the
names.  This isn't visible to a user unless they either:

 (a) Try to mount a filesystem that's converted to the internal mount API
     and that implements the ->parse_monolithic() context operation - and
     only then if they call security_fs_context_parse_param() rather than
     security_sb_eat_lsm_opts().

     There are no examples of this upstream yet, but nfs will probably want
     to do this for nfs2 or nfs3.

 (b) Use fsconfig() to configure the filesystem - in which case
     security_fs_context_parse_param() will be called.

This issue is that smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts() checks for the "smack" prefix
on the options, but smack_fs_context_parse_param() does not.

Fixes: c3300aaf95 ("smack: get rid of match_token()")
Fixes: 2febd254ad ("smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jose Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-06-14 14:25:04 -10:00
Thomas Gleixner
a10e763b87 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 372
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 135 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531081036.435762997@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-05 17:37:10 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
ec8f24b7fa treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/Kconfig
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-21 10:50:46 +02:00
Casey Schaufler
619ae03e92 Smack: Fix kbuild reported build error
The variable sap is defined under ifdef, but a recently
added use of the variable was not. Put that use under ifdef
as well.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-04-30 14:13:32 -07:00
Tetsuo Handa
b9ef5513c9 smack: Check address length before reading address family
KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to bind()/connect()/
sendmsg() is shorter than sizeof("struct sockaddr"->sa_family) bytes.

Also, since smk_ipv6_port_label()/smack_netlabel_send()/
smack_ipv6host_label()/smk_ipv6_check()/smk_ipv6_port_check() are not
checking valid address length and/or address family, make sure we check
both. The minimal valid length in smack_socket_connect() is changed from
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) bytes to SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 bytes, for it seems
that Smack is not using "struct sockaddr_in6"->sin6_scope_id field.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-04-29 17:32:27 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
f7450bc6e7 Smack: Fix IPv6 handling of 0 secmark
Handle the case where the skb for an IPv6 packet contains
a 0 in the secmark for a packet generated locally. This
can only happen for system packets, so allow the access.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-04-03 14:28:38 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
4e328b0888 Smack: Create smack_rule cache to optimize memory usage
This patch allows for small memory optimization by creating the
kmem cache for "struct smack_rule" instead of using kzalloc.
For adding new smack rule, kzalloc is used to allocate the memory
for "struct smack_rule". kzalloc will always allocate 32 or 64 bytes
for 1 structure depending upon the kzalloc cache sizes available in
system. Although the size of structure is 20 bytes only, resulting
in memory wastage per object in the default pool.

For e.g., if there are 20000 rules, then it will save 240KB(20000*12)
which is crucial for small memory targets.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-04-02 11:45:41 -07:00
Vishal Goel
460d95a1d6 smack: removal of global rule list
In this patch, global rule list has been removed. Now all
smack rules will be read using "smack_known_list". This list contains
all the smack labels and internally each smack label structure
maintains the list of smack rules corresponding to that smack label.
So there is no need to maintain extra list.

1) Small Memory Optimization
For eg. if there are 20000 rules, then it will save 625KB(20000*32),
which is critical for small embedded systems.
2) Reducing the time taken in writing rules on load/load2 interface
3) Since global rule list is just used to read the rules, so there
will be no performance impact on system

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@localhost.localdomain>
2019-04-02 11:45:22 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
7b47a9e7c8 Merge branch 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro:
 "The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the
  old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point
  conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some
  are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series
  outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing
  stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted
  filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the
  next cycle fodder.

  It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is
  probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the
  commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting
  the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better
  to fix it up after -rc1 instead.

  That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which
  should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size
  increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to
  shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next
  cycle"

* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits)
  afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount
  afs: Add fs_context support
  vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log
  vfs: Implement logging through fs_context
  vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API
  vfs: Remove kern_mount_data()
  hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context
  cpuset: Use fs_context
  kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context
  cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context
  cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper
  cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions
  cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context
  cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing
  cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing
  cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic()
  cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree()
  cgroup: start switching to fs_context
  ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context
  proc: Add fs_context support to procfs
  ...
2019-03-12 14:08:19 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
be37f21a08 audit/stable-5.1 PR 20190305
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAlx+8ZgUHHBhdWxAcGF1
 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXOlDhAAiGlirQ9syyG2fYzaARZZ2QoU/GGD
 PSAeiNmP3jvJzXArCvugRCw+YSNDdQOBM3SrLQC+cM0MAIDRYXN0NdcrsbTchlMA
 51Fx1egZ9Fyj+Ehgida3muh2lRUy7DQwMCL6tAVqwz7vYkSTGDUf+MlYqOqXDka5
 74pEExOS3Jdi7560BsE8b6QoW9JIJqEJnirXGkG9o2qC0oFHCR6PKxIyQ7TJrLR1
 F23aFTqLTH1nbPUQjnox2PTf13iQVh4j2gwzd+9c9KBfxoGSge3dmxId7BJHy2aG
 M27fPdCYTNZAGWpPVujsCPAh1WPQ9NQqg3mA9+g14PEbiLqPcqU+kWmnDU7T7bEw
 Qx0kt6Y8GiknwCqq8pDbKYclgRmOjSGdfutzd0z8uDpbaeunS4/NqnDb/FUaDVcr
 jA4d6ep7qEgHpYbL8KgOeZCexfaTfz6mcwRWNq3Uu9cLZbZqSSQ7PXolMADHvoRs
 LS7VH2jcP7q4p4GWmdfjv67xyUUo9HG5HHX74h5pLfQSYXiBWo4ht0UOAzX/6EcE
 CJNHAFHv+OanI5Rg/6JQ8b3/bJYxzAJVyLZpCuMtlKk6lYBGNeADk9BezEDIYsm8
 tSe4/GqqyR9+Qz8rSdpAZ0KKkfqS535IcHUPUJau7Bzg1xqSEP5gzZN6QsjdXg0+
 5wFFfdFICTfJFXo=
 =57/1
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.

  Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
  bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.

  Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
  and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
  all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
  capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
  filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.

  All changes pass the audit-testsuite.  Please merge for v5.1"

* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: mark expected switch fall-through
  audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
  audit: join tty records to their syscall
  audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
  audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
  audit: ignore fcaps on umount
  audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
  audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
  audit: add support for fcaps v3
  audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
  audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
  audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
  audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
2019-03-07 12:20:11 -08:00
Al Viro
0b52075ee6 introduce cloning of fs_context
new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context().  Comes with fs_context
method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts
of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for
doing the same to LSM parts.

[needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway]

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-28 03:29:27 -05:00
David Howells
2febd254ad smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks
Implement filesystem context security hooks for the smack LSM.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-28 03:29:25 -05:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva
09186e5034 security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.

This patch fixes the following warnings:

security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]

Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3

Also, add a missing break statement to fix the following warning:

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]

Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-22 09:56:09 -08:00