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Merge branch 'next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next

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This commit is contained in:
James Morris 2015-08-15 13:29:57 +10:00
commit 3e5f206c00
14 changed files with 918 additions and 113 deletions
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7
include/linux/lsm_audit.h
View file

@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ struct lsm_network_audit {
} fam;
};
struct lsm_ioctlop_audit {
struct path path;
u16 cmd;
};
/* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */
struct common_audit_data {
char type;
@ -53,6 +58,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD 8
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE 9
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY 10
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP 11
union {
struct path path;
struct dentry *dentry;
@ -68,6 +74,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
} key_struct;
#endif
char *kmod_name;
struct lsm_ioctlop_audit *op;
} u;
/* this union contains LSM specific data */
union {

1
scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
View file

@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
/* types, roles, and allows */
fprintf(fout, "type base_t;\n");
fprintf(fout, "role base_r;\n");
fprintf(fout, "role base_r types { base_t };\n");
for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++)
fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:%s *;\n",

15
security/lsm_audit.c
View file

@ -245,6 +245,21 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
}
break;
}
case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP: {
struct inode *inode;
audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &a->u.op->path);
inode = a->u.op->path.dentry->d_inode;
if (inode) {
audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ioctlcmd=%hx", a->u.op->cmd);
break;
}
case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY: {
struct inode *inode;

418
security/selinux/avc.c
View file

@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <linux/un.h>
#include <net/af_unix.h>
@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ struct avc_entry {
u32 tsid;
u16 tclass;
struct av_decision avd;
struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
};
struct avc_node {
@ -56,6 +58,16 @@ struct avc_node {
struct rcu_head rhead;
};
struct avc_xperms_decision_node {
struct extended_perms_decision xpd;
struct list_head xpd_list; /* list of extended_perms_decision */
};
struct avc_xperms_node {
struct extended_perms xp;
struct list_head xpd_head; /* list head of extended_perms_decision */
};
struct avc_cache {
struct hlist_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
spinlock_t slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
@ -80,6 +92,9 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep;
static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep;
static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep;
static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
@ -101,6 +116,7 @@ static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
return;
}
BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
perms = secclass_map[tclass-1].perms;
audit_log_format(ab, " {");
@ -149,7 +165,7 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
kfree(scontext);
}
BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
}
@ -170,7 +186,17 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
avc_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_node",
sizeof(struct avc_xperms_node),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
avc_xperms_decision_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
"avc_xperms_decision_node",
sizeof(struct avc_xperms_decision_node),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
avc_xperms_data_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_data",
sizeof(struct extended_perms_data),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
}
@ -205,9 +231,261 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
}
/*
* using a linked list for extended_perms_decision lookup because the list is
* always small. i.e. less than 5, typically 1
*/
static struct extended_perms_decision *avc_xperms_decision_lookup(u8 driver,
struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
{
struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
list_for_each_entry(xpd_node, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
if (xpd_node->xpd.driver == driver)
return &xpd_node->xpd;
}
return NULL;
}
static inline unsigned int
avc_xperms_has_perm(struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
u8 perm, u8 which)
{
unsigned int rc = 0;
if ((which == XPERMS_ALLOWED) &&
(xpd->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED))
rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
else if ((which == XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) &&
(xpd->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->auditallow->p, perm);
else if ((which == XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) &&
(xpd->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->dontaudit->p, perm);
return rc;
}
static void avc_xperms_allow_perm(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node,
u8 driver, u8 perm)
{
struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
security_xperm_set(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver);
xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
if (xpd && xpd->allowed)
security_xperm_set(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
}
static void avc_xperms_decision_free(struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node)
{
struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
if (xpd->allowed)
kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->allowed);
if (xpd->auditallow)
kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->auditallow);
if (xpd->dontaudit)
kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->dontaudit);
kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, xpd_node);
}
static void avc_xperms_free(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
{
struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node, *tmp;
if (!xp_node)
return;
list_for_each_entry_safe(xpd_node, tmp, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
list_del(&xpd_node->xpd_list);
avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
}
kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_cachep, xp_node);
}
static void avc_copy_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
struct extended_perms_decision *src)
{
dest->driver = src->driver;
dest->used = src->used;
if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
memcpy(dest->allowed->p, src->allowed->p,
sizeof(src->allowed->p));
if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
memcpy(dest->auditallow->p, src->auditallow->p,
sizeof(src->auditallow->p));
if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
memcpy(dest->dontaudit->p, src->dontaudit->p,
sizeof(src->dontaudit->p));
}
/*
* similar to avc_copy_xperms_decision, but only copy decision
* information relevant to this perm
*/
static inline void avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(u8 perm,
struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
struct extended_perms_decision *src)
{
/*
* compute index of the u32 of the 256 bits (8 u32s) that contain this
* command permission
*/
u8 i = perm >> 5;
dest->used = src->used;
if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
dest->allowed->p[i] = src->allowed->p[i];
if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
dest->auditallow->p[i] = src->auditallow->p[i];
if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
dest->dontaudit->p[i] = src->dontaudit->p[i];
}
static struct avc_xperms_decision_node
*avc_xperms_decision_alloc(u8 which)
{
struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep,
GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
if (!xpd_node)
return NULL;
xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
if (!xpd->allowed)
goto error;
}
if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
if (!xpd->auditallow)
goto error;
}
if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
if (!xpd->dontaudit)
goto error;
}
return xpd_node;
error:
avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
return NULL;
}
static int avc_add_xperms_decision(struct avc_node *node,
struct extended_perms_decision *src)
{
struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
node->ae.xp_node->xp.len++;
dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src->used);
if (!dest_xpd)
return -ENOMEM;
avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, src);
list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &node->ae.xp_node->xpd_head);
return 0;
}
static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void)
{
struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep,
GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
if (!xp_node)
return xp_node;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
return xp_node;
}
static int avc_xperms_populate(struct avc_node *node,
struct avc_xperms_node *src)
{
struct avc_xperms_node *dest;
struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
struct avc_xperms_decision_node *src_xpd;
if (src->xp.len == 0)
return 0;
dest = avc_xperms_alloc();
if (!dest)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(dest->xp.drivers.p, src->xp.drivers.p, sizeof(dest->xp.drivers.p));
dest->xp.len = src->xp.len;
/* for each source xpd allocate a destination xpd and copy */
list_for_each_entry(src_xpd, &src->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src_xpd->xpd.used);
if (!dest_xpd)
goto error;
avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, &src_xpd->xpd);
list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &dest->xpd_head);
}
node->ae.xp_node = dest;
return 0;
error:
avc_xperms_free(dest);
return -ENOMEM;
}
static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd,
struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
u8 perm,
int result,
u32 *deniedp)
{
u32 denied, audited;
denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
if (unlikely(denied)) {
audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
if (audited && xpd) {
if (avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
audited &= ~requested;
}
} else if (result) {
audited = denied = requested;
} else {
audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
if (audited && xpd) {
if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
audited &= ~requested;
}
}
*deniedp = denied;
return audited;
}
static inline int avc_xperms_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
u8 perm, int result,
struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
u32 audited, denied;
audited = avc_xperms_audit_required(
requested, avd, xpd, perm, result, &denied);
if (likely(!audited))
return 0;
return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
audited, denied, result, ad, 0);
}
static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
{
struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
}
@ -221,6 +499,7 @@ static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
{
avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
@ -367,6 +646,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @avd: resulting av decision
* @xp_node: resulting extended permissions
*
* Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
* (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
@ -378,7 +658,9 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
* the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
* avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
*/
static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
struct av_decision *avd,
struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
{
struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
int hvalue;
@ -391,10 +673,15 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_dec
if (node) {
struct hlist_head *head;
spinlock_t *lock;
int rc = 0;
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node);
if (rc) {
kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
return NULL;
}
head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
@ -523,14 +810,17 @@ out:
* @perms : Permission mask bits
* @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
* @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
* @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
*
* if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
* if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
* otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
* will release later by RCU.
*/
static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
u32 seqno)
static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
u32 flags)
{
int hvalue, rc = 0;
unsigned long flag;
@ -574,9 +864,19 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
if (orig->ae.xp_node) {
rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, orig->ae.xp_node);
if (rc) {
kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
goto out_unlock;
}
}
switch (event) {
case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
if (node->ae.xp_node && (flags & AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS))
avc_xperms_allow_perm(node->ae.xp_node, driver, xperm);
break;
case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
@ -594,6 +894,9 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
break;
case AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS:
avc_add_xperms_decision(node, xpd);
break;
}
avc_node_replace(node, orig);
out_unlock:
@ -665,18 +968,20 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
* results in a bigger stack frame.
*/
static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
{
rcu_read_unlock();
security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
rcu_read_lock();
return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
}
static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
unsigned flags,
struct av_decision *avd)
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
u8 driver, u8 xperm, unsigned flags,
struct av_decision *avd)
{
if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
return -EACCES;
@ -684,11 +989,91 @@ static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
return -EACCES;
avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver, xperm, ssid,
tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
return 0;
}
/*
* The avc extended permissions logic adds an additional 256 bits of
* permissions to an avc node when extended permissions for that node are
* specified in the avtab. If the additional 256 permissions is not adequate,
* as-is the case with ioctls, then multiple may be chained together and the
* driver field is used to specify which set contains the permission.
*/
int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
u8 driver, u8 xperm, struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
struct avc_node *node;
struct av_decision avd;
u32 denied;
struct extended_perms_decision local_xpd;
struct extended_perms_decision *xpd = NULL;
struct extended_perms_data allowed;
struct extended_perms_data auditallow;
struct extended_perms_data dontaudit;
struct avc_xperms_node local_xp_node;
struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
int rc = 0, rc2;
xp_node = &local_xp_node;
BUG_ON(!requested);
rcu_read_lock();
node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
if (unlikely(!node)) {
node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
} else {
memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
xp_node = node->ae.xp_node;
}
/* if extended permissions are not defined, only consider av_decision */
if (!xp_node || !xp_node->xp.len)
goto decision;
local_xpd.allowed = &allowed;
local_xpd.auditallow = &auditallow;
local_xpd.dontaudit = &dontaudit;
xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
if (unlikely(!xpd)) {
/*
* Compute the extended_perms_decision only if the driver
* is flagged
*/
if (!security_xperm_test(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver)) {
avd.allowed &= ~requested;
goto decision;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
security_compute_xperms_decision(ssid, tsid, tclass, driver,
&local_xpd);
rcu_read_lock();
avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested, driver, xperm,
ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno, &local_xpd, 0);
} else {
avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(xperm, &local_xpd, xpd);
}
xpd = &local_xpd;
if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, xperm, XPERMS_ALLOWED))
avd.allowed &= ~requested;
decision:
denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
if (unlikely(denied))
rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, driver, xperm,
AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);
rcu_read_unlock();
rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
&avd, xpd, xperm, rc, ad);
if (rc2)
return rc2;
return rc;
}
/**
* avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
@ -716,6 +1101,7 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
struct av_decision *avd)
{
struct avc_node *node;
struct avc_xperms_node xp_node;
int rc = 0;
u32 denied;
@ -725,13 +1111,13 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
if (unlikely(!node))
node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
else
memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
if (unlikely(denied))
rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, flags, avd);
rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0, flags, avd);
rcu_read_unlock();
return rc;

147
security/selinux/hooks.c
View file

@ -254,10 +254,21 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
/*
* As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
* empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
* time taking a lock doing nothing.
*
* The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
* It should not be possible for this function to be called with
* concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
* in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
*/
if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
list_del_init(&isec->list);
spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
}
/*
* The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
@ -1698,6 +1709,32 @@ out:
return rc;
}
/*
* Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
*/
static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *name,
u16 tclass,
u32 *_new_isid)
{
const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = dir->i_security;
const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
(sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
*_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
} else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
tsec->create_sid) {
*_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
} else {
return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
name, _new_isid);
}
return 0;
}
/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
@ -1714,7 +1751,6 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
sid = tsec->sid;
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
@ -1725,12 +1761,10 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
if (rc)
return rc;
if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
&dentry->d_name, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
&newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
if (rc)
@ -2704,32 +2738,14 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
u32 *ctxlen)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
struct inode *dir = d_backing_inode(dentry->d_parent);
u32 newsid;
int rc;
tsec = cred->security;
dsec = dir->i_security;
sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
} else {
rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
name,
&newsid);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
__func__, -rc);
return rc;
}
}
rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
&newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
}
@ -2752,22 +2768,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
sid = tsec->sid;
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
(sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
qstr, &newsid);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
"security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
"ino=%ld)\n",
__func__,
-rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
return rc;
}
}
rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(
dir, qstr,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
&newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
@ -3228,6 +3234,46 @@ static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
file_free_security(file);
}
/*
* Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
* operation to an inode.
*/
int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
u32 requested, u16 cmd)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
int rc;
u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
ad.u.op = &ioctl;
ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
SECCLASS_FD,
FD__USE,
&ad);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
out:
return rc;
}
static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
@ -3270,7 +3316,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
* to the file's ioctl() function.
*/
default:
error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
}
return error;
}
@ -4520,6 +4566,7 @@ static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
sk->sk_security = sksec;

6
security/selinux/include/avc.h
View file

@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
}
#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
#define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2 /* update extended permissions */
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
unsigned flags,
@ -156,6 +157,10 @@ int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
int flags);
int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad);
u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
#define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT 1
@ -166,6 +171,7 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE 32
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128
#define AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS 256
int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);

32
security/selinux/include/security.h
View file

@ -35,13 +35,14 @@
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS 27
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE 28
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES 29
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL 30
/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
#else
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL
#endif
/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
@ -109,11 +110,38 @@ struct av_decision {
u32 flags;
};
#define XPERMS_ALLOWED 1
#define XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 2
#define XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 4
#define security_xperm_set(perms, x) (perms[x >> 5] |= 1 << (x & 0x1f))
#define security_xperm_test(perms, x) (1 & (perms[x >> 5] >> (x & 0x1f)))
struct extended_perms_data {
u32 p[8];
};
struct extended_perms_decision {
u8 used;
u8 driver;
struct extended_perms_data *allowed;
struct extended_perms_data *auditallow;
struct extended_perms_data *dontaudit;
};
struct extended_perms {
u16 len; /* length associated decision chain */
struct extended_perms_data drivers; /* flag drivers that are used */
};
/* definitions of av_decision.flags */
#define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001
void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
struct extended_perms *xperms);
void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
u8 driver, struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);

104
security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
View file

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include "policydb.h"
static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep;
/* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
* public domain.
@ -70,11 +71,24 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
{
struct avtab_node *newnode;
struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (newnode == NULL)
return NULL;
newnode->key = *key;
newnode->datum = *datum;
if (key->specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
xperms = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (xperms == NULL) {
kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
return NULL;
}
*xperms = *(datum->u.xperms);
newnode->datum.u.xperms = xperms;
} else {
newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
}
if (prev) {
newnode->next = prev->next;
prev->next = newnode;
@ -107,8 +121,12 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_dat
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
(specified & cur->key.specified))
(specified & cur->key.specified)) {
/* extended perms may not be unique */
if (specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
break;
return -EEXIST;
}
if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
break;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
@ -271,6 +289,9 @@ void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
while (cur) {
temp = cur;
cur = cur->next;
if (temp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
kmem_cache_free(avtab_xperms_cachep,
temp->datum.u.xperms);
kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
}
}
@ -359,7 +380,10 @@ static uint16_t spec_order[] = {
AVTAB_AUDITALLOW,
AVTAB_TRANSITION,
AVTAB_CHANGE,
AVTAB_MEMBER
AVTAB_MEMBER,
AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED,
AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW,
AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
};
int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
@ -369,10 +393,11 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
{
__le16 buf16[4];
u16 enabled;
__le32 buf32[7];
u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers;
struct avtab_key key;
struct avtab_datum datum;
struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
int i, rc;
unsigned set;
@ -429,11 +454,15 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (val & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
if (val & spec_order[i]) {
key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
datum.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
if (rc)
return rc;
@ -476,14 +505,42 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) &&
(key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: policy version %u does not "
"support extended permissions rules and one "
"was specified\n", vers);
return -EINVAL;
} else if (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms));
rc = next_entry(&xperms.specified, fp, sizeof(u8));
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p); i++)
xperms.perms.p[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
datum.u.xperms = &xperms;
} else {
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
}
datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data)) {
!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@ -543,8 +600,9 @@ bad:
int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
{
__le16 buf16[4];
__le32 buf32[1];
__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p)];
int rc;
unsigned int i;
buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
@ -553,8 +611,22 @@ int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.data);
rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->specified, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->driver, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p); i++)
buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]);
rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p), fp);
} else {
buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
}
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
@ -588,9 +660,13 @@ void avtab_cache_init(void)
avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
sizeof(struct avtab_node),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_extended_perms",
sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}
void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep);
kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_xperms_cachep);
}

33
security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
View file

@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
#define _SS_AVTAB_H_
#include "security.h"
#include <linux/flex_array.h>
struct avtab_key {
@ -37,13 +38,43 @@ struct avtab_key {
#define AVTAB_MEMBER 0x0020
#define AVTAB_CHANGE 0x0040
#define AVTAB_TYPE (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
/* extended permissions */
#define AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED 0x0100
#define AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 0x0200
#define AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 0x0400
#define AVTAB_XPERMS (AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED | \
AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW | \
AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
};
/*
* For operations that require more than the 32 permissions provided by the avc
* extended permissions may be used to provide 256 bits of permissions.
*/
struct avtab_extended_perms {
/* These are not flags. All 256 values may be used */
#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION 0x01
#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER 0x02
/* extension of the avtab_key specified */
u8 specified; /* ioctl, netfilter, ... */
/*
* if 256 bits is not adequate as is often the case with ioctls, then
* multiple extended perms may be used and the driver field
* specifies which permissions are included.
*/
u8 driver;
/* 256 bits of permissions */
struct extended_perms_data perms;
};
struct avtab_datum {
u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
union {
u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
} u;
};
struct avtab_node {

38
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
View file

@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include "security.h"
#include "conditional.h"
#include "services.h"
/*
* cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
@ -612,21 +613,39 @@ int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp)
return 0;
}
/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
* av table, and if so, add them to the result
*/
void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd)
void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
{
struct avtab_node *node;
if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
if (!ctab || !key || !xpermd)
return;
for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
}
return;
}
/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
* av table, and if so, add them to the result
*/
void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms)
{
struct avtab_node *node;
if (!ctab || !key || !avd || !xperms)
return;
for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
(node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
(node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
/* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
@ -634,10 +653,13 @@ void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decisi
* the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
* are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
*/
avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
(node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
if ((node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
(node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
}
return;
}

6
security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
View file

@ -73,8 +73,10 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp);
void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd);
void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node);
#endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */

5
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
View file

@ -148,6 +148,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
};
static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)

213
security/selinux/ss/services.c
View file

@ -93,9 +93,10 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
u32 *scontext_len);
static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
struct context *tcontext,
u16 tclass,
struct av_decision *avd);
struct context *tcontext,
u16 tclass,
struct av_decision *avd,
struct extended_perms *xperms);
struct selinux_mapping {
u16 value; /* policy value */
@ -565,7 +566,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
tcontext,
tclass,
&lo_avd);
&lo_avd,
NULL);
if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
return; /* no masked permission */
masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
@ -580,7 +582,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
&lo_tcontext,
tclass,
&lo_avd);
&lo_avd,
NULL);
if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
return; /* no masked permission */
masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
@ -596,7 +599,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
&lo_tcontext,
tclass,
&lo_avd);
&lo_avd,
NULL);
if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
return; /* no masked permission */
masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
@ -613,13 +617,39 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
}
/*
* Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
* the permissions in a particular class.
* flag which drivers have permissions
* only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
*/
void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
struct extended_perms *xperms,
struct avtab_node *node)
{
unsigned int i;
if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
/* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
} else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
/* if allowing permissions within a driver */
security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
}
/* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED)
xperms->len = 1;
}
/*
* Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
* structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
*/
static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
struct context *tcontext,
u16 tclass,
struct av_decision *avd)
struct context *tcontext,
u16 tclass,
struct av_decision *avd,
struct extended_perms *xperms)
{
struct constraint_node *constraint;
struct role_allow *ra;
@ -633,6 +663,10 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
avd->allowed = 0;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
if (xperms) {
memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
xperms->len = 0;
}
if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
if (printk_ratelimit())
@ -647,7 +681,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
* this permission check, then use it.
*/
avkey.target_class = tclass;
avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
BUG_ON(!sattr);
tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
@ -660,15 +694,18 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
node;
node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
}
/* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
avd, xperms);
}
}
@ -899,6 +936,139 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
avd->flags = 0;
}
void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
struct avtab_node *node)
{
unsigned int i;
if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
return;
} else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
xpermd->driver))
return;
} else {
BUG();
}
if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
}
if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
}
} else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
}
if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
}
} else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
}
if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
}
} else {
BUG();
}
}
void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
u32 tsid,
u16 orig_tclass,
u8 driver,
struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
{
u16 tclass;
struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
struct avtab_key avkey;
struct avtab_node *node;
struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
unsigned int i, j;
xpermd->driver = driver;
xpermd->used = 0;
memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
if (!ss_initialized)
goto allow;
scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, ssid);
goto out;
}
tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
if (!tcontext) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, tsid);
goto out;
}
tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
if (policydb.allow_unknown)
goto allow;
goto out;
}
if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
goto out;
}
avkey.target_class = tclass;
avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
scontext->type - 1);
BUG_ON(!sattr);
tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
tcontext->type - 1);
BUG_ON(!tattr);
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
avkey.source_type = i + 1;
avkey.target_type = j + 1;
for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
node;
node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
&avkey, xpermd);
}
}
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return;
allow:
memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
goto out;
}
/**
* security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
@ -906,6 +1076,7 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @avd: access vector decisions
* @xperms: extended permissions
*
* Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
* SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
@ -913,13 +1084,15 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
u32 tsid,
u16 orig_tclass,
struct av_decision *avd)
struct av_decision *avd,
struct extended_perms *xperms)
{
u16 tclass;
struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
avd_init(avd);
xperms->len = 0;
if (!ss_initialized)
goto allow;
@ -947,7 +1120,7 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
goto allow;
goto out;
}
context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms);
map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
@ -993,7 +1166,7 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
goto out;
}
context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return;
@ -1515,7 +1688,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
if (avdatum) {
/* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
}
/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */

6
security/selinux/ss/services.h
View file

@ -11,5 +11,11 @@
extern struct policydb policydb;
void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
struct avtab_node *node);
void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
struct avtab_node *node);
#endif /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */